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Abstract 
The Herero/Nama Genocide (1904-1908) under German colonialism in Namibia is the first genocide 
of the twentieth century and has stirred debates around reparations for historical injustices. Reparative 
Justice has evolved into a victim-centric pillar of justice, in which perpetrators are legally and morally 
obligated to pay reparations in its several forms to its victims, including material and symbolic 
reparations. This thesis is a case study of reparations claims for historical injustices, specifically 
colonial genocide and explores such claims as a political process. Firstly, defining victims of genocide 
is a political process in which colonial atrocities have been blanketed by a lawless cover, previously 
ignoring the rights of the former colonised. The acknowledgement of genocide victims is a not only a 
necessary step to claiming reparations, but is part of Reparative Justice in which the perpetrator 
recognises its victims, offers a formal apology and make amends to the victims’ satisfaction. The 
acknowledgement of the Herero and Nama as victims of genocide has taken over a century for the 
German government to admit. Secondly, reparations claims is a political process in which requests are 
demanded and/or negotiated between perpetrator and victim. Germany’s previous foreign policy 
avoided terms such as ‘genocide’ and ‘reparations’, which has been a form of colonial amnesia. 
Namibian actors cannot easily forget the weight of the genocide and have had to negotiate and 
demand overdue justice in the face of colonial amnesia.   
Victim groups often do not speak with one voice, as noted in the Herero group, which is divided into 
general two camps: the Riruako group and the Maherero group. Under Paramount Chief Riruako, and 
his successor Rukoro, the Ovaherero Traditional Authority (OTA) have made several reparations 
claims to Germany over the last three decades. The Namibian government has previously played an 
unsupportive role, due to Germany’s annual development aid, which has undermined the position of 
the Riruako group. However, Riruako’s Motion on the Ovaherero Genocide in 2006, was 
unanimously passed and requested that the Namibian government facilitates negotiations between 
Germany and representatives of the affected communities. The two governments have since entered 
formal 
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negotiations on how to address the past, however this has been resented by the OTA and some 
reparations organisations, who argue that the Namibian government have taken the lead on 
negotiations, rather than facilitate them. Those participating in government negotiations are the 
Maherero group, and those who have refused to join is the Riruako group, who have lodged a lawsuit 
in 2017 against the German government for reparations. In 2015, the German government admitted 
that its shared history with Namibia involved genocide. However, this acknowledgement has 
transferred limited power to the Namibian actors who continue to be undermined as ‘equal’ 
counterparts to the German government. The German government continue to negotiate on their terms 
of redress, and have claimed state immunity towards the lawsuit. Therefore, there are small traces of 
colonial amnesia in Germany’s conduct despite its recent change in foreign policy.  
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1. Introduction  
  
1.1. Thesis Topic Overview 
 
Addressing historical injustices through reparations has gained momentum in Namibia in the last three 
decades, regarding the Herero/Nama Genocide (1904-1908). The Herero and Nama in Namibia, then 
known as German South West Africa (GSWA), experienced the first genocide of the twentieth century 
under German colonialism. The relentless and systematic killing of Herero and Nama civilians was 
sanctioned by German Kaiser Wilhelm II, and resulted in the loss of approximately 80 percent of the 
Herero population and 50 percent of the Nama.1 Furthermore, the affected communities were stripped 
of prime arable land by the Kaiser’s imperial decree in 1905,2 resulting in economic and cultural losses 
of the affected groups. Throughout the last century, the genocide shaped the Herero traditional 
authorities, who pursued land restoration from South African authorities, who began to administer 
Namibia in 1915, and restoration of dignities through equal rights from the United Nations (UN) post 
1945. However, given the social conditions within a colonial context, attempts for restoration were 
unsuccessful. Following independence in 1990, Herero leaders began articulating specific requests for 
reparations from the German government, whom they argued inherited the state responsibility to 
address this colonial genocide.3 The topic has been the source of international and local political tension, 
the latter involving the Namibian government, who have relied on German development aid since 
independence.4 The Namibian government officiated their support for reparations claims in 2006, 
through the unanimous adoption of the Motion on Genocide in parliament.5 Over a century after the 
genocide, and after much persistence of Namibian actors in pursuit of justice, Germany officiated their 
                                                          
1 Jeremy Sarkin, Germany’s Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers 
(Cape Town: UCT Press, 2011), 137. 
2 David Olusoga & Casper W. Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, (London: faber and faber, 2010), 193.  
3 Interview with Uazuva Kaumbi, September 4, 2018. 
4 Jeremy Sarkin, Colonial Germany Genocide and Reparations Claims in the 21st Century: The Socio-Legal 
Contexts of Claims under International Law by the Herero against Germany for Genocide in Namibia, 1904-
1908, (United States of America: Greenwood Publishing group, 2009), 60-61. 
5 Interview with Dr Zedekia Ngavirue, September 5, 2018.  
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acknowledgement of the genocide in 20156 and are negotiating their state responsibility to repair with 
the Namibian government.7 However, Germany continues to ignore some Herero actors who have 
arguably initiated the reparations process.   
 
Reparations is a process that involves either or both material and symbolic transferrals from 
perpetrator/s to its victim/s with the aim of repairing in full or in part damages of the injustice. 
Reparations is a legal term and practice that was initially conceived between Western states, therefore 
reparations was initially conceived as payments between European states.8 Richard M. Buxbaum looks 
at the legal history of international reparations and notes that before World War I (WWI), the nature of 
state-to-state reparations often involved the payment of resources by the vanquished state to the 
victorious as an element of peace negotiations.9 Buxbaum notes that before WWI, reparations had no 
particular moral connotations and were limited to the precedent nature of the post-war context. 
Therefore, reparations started as a political process in which the victor of conflict determined its 
opponent’s punishment. However in a context of growing recognition of universal Human Rights, 
reparations has evolved over the last century in international law for perpetrators of injustice to bear a 
moral and legal obligation to victims. It is an equitable principle where “the beneficiary of an ill-gotten 
gain should make restitution, both as an act of contrition and good will, but also simply to restore the 
victim to some part of their previous lives.”10  
 
                                                          
6 Mia Swart, ‘Herero make new claim for genocide reparations against Germany’, Mail & Guardian: Africa’s 
Best Read, January 25, 2017, https://mg.co.za/article/2017-01-24-herero-make-new-claim-for-genocide-
reparations-against-germany (accessed June 29, 2018).   
7 Interview with Dr Zedekia Ngavirue, September 5, 2018.  
8 Stephen Peté & Max du Plessis, ‘Reparations for Gross Violations of Human Rights in Context,’ in Repairing 
the Past? International Perspectives on Reparations for Gross Human Rights Abuses, ed. Stephen Peté & Max 
du Plessis (Antwerp: Instersentia, 2007), 11.  
9 Richard M. Buxbaum, ‘A Legal History of International Reparations,’ Berkeley Journal of International Law, 
Volume 23, Issue 2, Article 5 (2005): 319.  
10 Sidney Harring, ‘German Reparations to the Herero Nation: An Assertion of the Herero Nationhood in the 
path of Namibian Development,’ West Virginia Law Review, Volume 104 (2002): 404-405. 
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German reparations of WWII to Holocaust victims shifted public discourse on reparations from state 
centred to societal/individual centred reparations.11 Reparations has a moral component that encourages 
the perpetrator of an injustice to make amends with victims through conciliatory conduct of material 
and symbolic transferrals. Its focus has shifted from the punishment of perpetrator to the needs of the 
victim.12 Bernard R. Boxill (1979) argues that reparations is greater than the transferal of resources from 
the ‘injurer’ to the victim and involves the acknowledgement by the injurer of his/her unlawful act.13 
Therefore, any transferrals which excludes the victim’s expression of grievances and the respectful 
acknowledgement by the injurer will fall short of Reparative Justice as the dignity of the victim 
continues to be offended. Material and symbolic reparations are therefore complimentary, and both 
essential for the victims’ repair.  
 
Hitler’s Final Solution to destroy the Jewish population in Europe – and more broadly, the Holocaust 
which also targeted the Roma, Sinti and homosexuals – has been widely accepted as genocide, a crime 
so unique and cruel in its intentions and practice. The Jewish Polish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin coined 
the term genocide during WWII and campaigned at the UN to outlaw the specific practices of genocide 
in international law. Genocide has been defined in the 1948 UN Genocide Convention as the “intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”14 The UN regards genocide 
as the “ultimate crime and the gravest violation of human rights…possible to commit.”15 The murder 
of approximately six million Jewish people in WWII, including women, children and the elderly, solely 
based on their group identity, has been publicly condemned by the international community and by the 
                                                          
11 Buxbaum, ‘A Legal History of International Reparations,’ 314.  
12 Gerry Johnstone, Restorative Justice: Ideas, Values, Debates (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2002), 1. 
13Haig Khatchadourian, ‘Compensation and Reparations as Forms of Compensatory Justice,’ in Genocide’s 
Aftermath: Responsibility and Repair, ed. Claudia Card and Armen T. Marsoobian (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007), 148.  
14 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951, 
http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-
crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20o
f%20Genocide.pdf  
15 United Nations Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, UN Whitaker Report on 
Genocide, United Nations, July 2, 1985, Thirty-eighth session, Item 4 of the provisional agenda, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, p5, paragraph 14, 
http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/UNdocs/whitaker/section5.htm  
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German government. After the campaigning of Jewish organisations and Israel, the German government 
has apologised for the Jewish Holocaust, and have acknowledged and accepted state responsibility to 
pay reparations based on its predecessor’s crimes.  
  
Issues around forgotten genocides have arisen in political and academic spheres, especially concerning 
colonial contexts, highlighting that the events of the Holocaust were not necessarily new war tactics, 
however were new to European civilians. Some scholars, such as David Olusoga and Casper Erichsen 
(2010) and Reinhart Kössler (2015) have referred to this as ‘colonial amnesia’, in which Europe has a 
tendency to forget its colonial past.16 Kössler refers to ‘denialism’, similar to amnesia, which ignores 
the narratives of previous colonial subjects.17 Victims of colonial atrocities, moreover colonial 
genocide, arguably face different obstacles to have their injustice acknowledged and atoned for. The 
Herero/Nama Genocide has gained international attention due to the plight for justice under the pursuit 
of members of the Herero and Nama community. The German government’s previous hesitations to 
acknowledge the atrocity as genocide and their state responsibility to repair through reparations, have 
shifted in 2015 when the German Chancellor publicly acknowledged this genocide and the German 
government entered state-to-state negotiations with the Namibian government.18 This thesis will explore 
the political sphere in which reparation claims unavoidably fall into, arguing that reparations is not only 
a legal and moral responsibility to repair, but is also a political process in which positions of power 
define and recognise victims. More specifically, positions of power shape victim group mobilisation to 
negotiate acknowledgement that warrants justice and how Germany, as a former coloniser, responds to 
claims.  
                                                          
16 Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 344.  
17 Reinhart Kössler, Namibia and Germany: Negotiating the Past (Windhoek: University of Namibia Press, 
2015), 119. 
18 Reinhart Kössler & Henning Melber, ‘Namibian genocide victims’ remains are home. But Germany still has 
work to do,’ The Conversation Africa Inc., September 4, 2018, https://theconversation.com/namibian-genocide-
victims-remains-are-home-but-germany-still-has-work-to-do-102655 (accessed January 11, 2019). 
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1.2. Context  
German colonialism (1884-1915) in South West Africa (Namibia) introduced the first genocide of the 
twentieth century. After the arrival of German settlers and Colonial Administration, the Herero and 
Nama groups based in central and southern Namibia suffered drastic loss of land, cattle and power under 
biased judicial laws.19 This resulted in the 1904 Herero War, where some groups rebelled against 
German authorities. As a response, the Kaiser appointed General von Trotha, a hardened colonial 
‘specialist’,20 deployed 2,000 German soldiers, and instructed that the war end by any means even 
though the Herero chiefs attempted to negotiate peace.21 What followed was the onslaught of Hereros, 
and later the Namas who rebelled in 1905. Von Trotha issued an extermination order for the Herero 
(October 1904) and for the Nama (April 1905), declaring that any Herero and Nama, including women 
and children, with or without a gun, would be shot.22 Surrenders were not permitted at first and the 
Herero, including the tribes that did not rebel, and the Nama groups that had rebelled, were tracked and 
killed. In 1905, the colonial administration permitted the surrender of Hereros and Namas in hiding and 
placed them in concentration camps that administered the systematic killing of men, women and 
children. This was done through forced-labour, rape, as well as a result of malnutrition, diseases with 
no medical attention, and extreme climate conditions especially along the coast. When the concentration 
camps closed in 1908, the German colonial administration reported that of the 15,000 Herero and 2,000 
Namas in captivity, more than half had perished.23  
 
Germany lost its colonies as a result of its defeat in WWI, and Namibia became a mandate of South 
Africa. Under a white-led South Africa, all black Namibians experienced oppression, discrimination 
and segregation.24 Under such circumstances, any attempts for land restoration by the Herero leaders 
                                                          
19 Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 116-119.  
20 Ibid., 135.  
21 Ibid., 144.  
22 The Nama and Ovaherero Traditional Leaders, Joint Position Paper from the Nama and Ovaherero People on 
the Issue of Genocide and Reparations, 2007, http://www.freiburg-postkolonial.de/pdf/2007-Ovaherero-Nama-
Position-Paper.pdf  
23 Sarkin, Germany’s Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers, 141-
142.  
24 Apartheid was officially introduced into Namibia in 1948. 
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were ignored in favour of white supremacy and settler unity. Throughout all these injustices, the 
genocide has shaped the identities of the affected communities. The events of 1904-1908, particularly 
concerning the Herero group, have been described as genocide by Lemkin in the 1950s, in his attempt 
to write a History of Genocide25 following the ratification of the UN Genocide Convention.26 In 1985, 
the UN Whitaker Report on genocides officially acknowledged the ‘Herero massacre’ as genocide.27 
Germany, however, only officially acknowledged this ‘war’ as genocide in 2015.28  
 
After little success for land restoration during colonialism and Apartheid, the reparation movement, 
initially speared by Ovaherero Traditional Authority (OTA) and activists, made its first official requests 
in 1995, following Namibian independence in 1990. In 1995, the late Paramount Chief Riruako handed 
a petition to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl during a state visit to Namibia, requesting for the 
acknowledgement of genocide, apology and monetary compensation of 600 million USD from the 
German government.29 The German government argued that there was no legal grounds for reparations, 
and the German President Roman Herzog argued that too much time had passed for an apology. 
Furthermore, it was argued that Germany acknowledged a responsibility to Namibia by contributing 
substantial annual development aid to the Namibian government. Sarkin (2009) estimated that Germany 
paid 20 million USD per year to the Namibian government.30 Therefore, the reparation movement at 
this stage did not have the official support of the Namibian government. Legal action was taken in 2001, 
Riruako’s Hosea Kutako Foundation filed a lawsuit in the US Columbia District Court, attempting to 
sue three German companies and the German government for four billion USD, including a request for 
                                                          
25 Due to Lemkin’s untimely death in 1959, History of Genocide remains unpublished. Therefore, this thesis has 
relied on the works of scholars who have had access to Lemkin’s unpublished works and personal journals.  
26 John Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008). 
27 Jonathan Stempel, ‘Germany is sued in U.S. over early-1900s Namibia Slaughter’, Reuters, January, 5, 2017, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-namibia-genocide-lawsuit-idUSKBN14P25O (accessed June 29, 
2017).  
28 Swart, ‘Herero make new claim for genocide reparations against Germany’.   
29 Harring, ‘German Reparations to the Herero Nation: An Assertion of the Herero Nationhood in the path of 
Namibian Development’, 395. 
30 Sarkin, Colonial Germany Genocide and Reparations Claims in the 21st Century: The Socio-Legal Contexts of 
Claims under International Law by the Herero against Germany for Genocide in Namibia, 1904-1908, 60-61.  
10 
 
a formal apology.31 Although this case was unsuccessful and the District Court found that there was a 
failure to state a case, the German government assured the Herero community on several occasions that 
its development aid is based on their shared history which prioritised looking to the future over the past. 
However no formal apologies had been given, and development aid through government did not 
guarantee that the affected communities would benefit from Germany’s contributions.  
 
In 2006, Riruako introduced the Motion on Genocide to the Namibian parliament, calling for the 
Namibian government’s support in facilitating dialogue between the affected communities and the 
German government, in which reparations in the form of an apology, acknowledgement, and monetary 
compensation can be negotiated. 32 The motion received the overwhelming support from the Namibian 
parliament and responsibilities were passed to the Executive Arm.33 Subsequently, the Namibian 
government pursued bilateral negotiations with the German government in which it raised the issues 
brought to them by members of the affected community. As negotiated between the two governments, 
Germany formally acknowledged the genocide in 2015. The two governments officiated dialogue 
through the appointments of the Namibian Special Envoy, Zedekia Ngavirue, and the German Special 
Envoy, Ruprecht Polenz, to negotiate the issues of genocide and reparations.   
 
 However, those under the new Herero Paramount Chief Rukoro, Riruako’s successor, argue for a 
trialogue in which elected representatives are equal counterparts to the two governments.34 This group 
publicly expressed that the two governments have not offered the appropriate platform for elected 
members of the affected communities to negotiate reparations on their own behalf with the German 
government. This was articulated in 2007 when Riruako and the late Nama Chief David Frederick 
                                                          
31 Allan Cooper, ‘Reparations for the Herero Genocide: Defining the Limits of International Litigation,’ African 
Affairs, Volume 106, Issue 422 (2006): 113.  
32 Kuaima Riruako, Motion on the Ovaherero Genocide, National Assembly of the Republic of Namibia. 2006, 
http://genocide-namibia.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2006_09_Motion_Genocide_nam_parliament-1.pdf  
33 Interview with Dr Zedekia Ngavirue, September 5, 2018.  
34 Ellie Hamrick & Haley Duschinski, ‘Enduring injustices: Memory politics and Namibia’s genocide 
reparations movement’, Memory Studies, The City University of New York, (2011): 7.  
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signed a joint position paper in which they “do not accept that we [they] have initially raised the issue 
and now it should be about us and yet without us.”35 Therefore, the Ovaherero Genocide Foundation 
(OGF) and the Nama Genocide Technical Committee (NGTC), under respective traditional authorities 
(Rukoro and Frederick), have lodged a lawsuit in the New York District Court in March 2017 against 
the German government, calling for reparations and their right to represent themselves in governmental 
negotiations. While Germany maintains a ‘cordial’ relationship with the Namibian government in the 
hopes of finding what German Special Envoy Polenz describes as a ‘common understanding’ on the 
events of the past,36 the German government have argued state immunity against the OGF and NGTC 
lawsuit claims.37  
 
1.3. Theoretical Approach and Methodology  
This thesis is a case study of reparations and the politics that shape the validity, processes and outcomes 
of reparations claims for colonial genocide. Reparations claims from the German government for the 
Herero/Nama Genocide is one example of several the former colonised seeking justice from former 
colonisers.38 More specifically, it is one example where direct victims and perpetrators have since 
passed away, and descendants of victims of state organised genocide seek delayed justice from 
governments who have inherited the state responsibility of the perpetrators.39 Although Herero/Nama 
Genocide reparation claims can be situated in a larger context of reparation claims for genocide and/or 
                                                          
35 The Nama and Ovaherero Traditional Leaders, Joint Position Paper from the Nama and Ovaherero People on 
the Issue of Genocide and Reparations.  
36 Isaac Mugabi, ‘Polenz: ‘Germany and Namibia need a common understanding of the past,’ Deutsche Welle, 
September 4, 2015, https://www.dw.com/en/polenz-germany-and-namibia-need-a-common-understanding-of-
the-past/a-18826081 (accessed October 10, 2018).  
37 Interview with Uazuva Kaumbi, September 4, 2018. 
38 In 2009, Italy agreed to pay Libya US$10 billion for atrocities committed during colonialism. In 2011, the 
British government agreed to pay reparations to detention survivors from the Mau Mau Rebellion (1950s) in 
Kenya. Canadian government agreed in 2017 to pay reparations, approximately US $600 million to aboriginals 
forcibly removed from their families and placed in Indian Residential Schools that saw to their cultural 
destruction. In 2018, 30 Cyprians won a lawsuit against the British government for human rights abuses in 
1950s under colonialism.  
39 Similarly, the Tanzanian government has announced its intentions to demand monetary compensation from 
the German government for colonial crimes committed during 1905-1907 in the Maji Maji rebellion. 
Descendants from the Armenian Genocide have been vocal around reparations from the Turkish government. 
Reparations for slavery and genocide against Native Americans having become increasingly pressing in the last 
decade.  
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colonial atrocities, this case study approach looks at the specific circumstances and results of the 1904-
1908 genocide on the affected communities and their descendants, and the political openings and 
complexities of reparation claims in post-colonial Namibia a century later. In order to unpack these 
complexities, which are determined by post-colonial political power structures, this case study will fall 
primarily under Reparative Justice Theory framework, complemented by Critical Victimology Theory. 
Lastly, although the Herero and Nama are both affected by genocide and involved in the reparation 
movement, this paper is centred on the Herero group who have had, to a larger extent, a greater presence 
in shaping the plight for justice over the last century and the first decade of independence.40   
 
The research topic – Politics of Reparations: unravelling the power relations in the Herero/Nama 
Genocide reparations movement – can be unpacked into several interrelated components: politics 
around defining and acknowledging victims of genocide; politics of accepting responsibility to repair; 
and politics of negotiating remedies of reparations. The overall component that runs through this thesis 
is how do actors’ positions of power relate to one another when addressing the past through reparations 
claims. This thesis concurs with Reinhart Kössler’s argument; that the relationship between Namibia 
and Germany in a post-colonial context is one that has been negotiated through asymmetrical positions 
of power between.41 This topic will be explored under several questions. Chapter two will deliberate 
the first question: how are victims of genocide defined by international standards in order to garner 
support for reparations claims? For this important question, a Critical Victimology theoretical 
framework will be applied to explore the extent to which positions of and access to power define 
victimisation, what groups are acknowledged as ‘victims’ and what atrocities are defined as ‘genocide’. 
                                                          
40 Scholarship on the Herero over the last century is significantly more prominent. During the research for this 
thesis, it has been observed that often the Nama group are incorporated as an additive to the study of the 
genocide, with the exception of the Olusoga & Erichsen’s The Kaiser’s Holocaust (2010) that looks into both 
experiences of the Namas and the Hereros in equal weight. This can be noted in the UN Whitaker Report that 
acknowledged the Herero massacre as genocide, with no mention of the Nama. More specifically, before the 
Nama entered a joint pursuit for reparations, as highlighted in the 2006 Motion and the 2007 Joint Position 
Paper from the Nama and the Ovaherero People on the Issue of Genocide and Reparation, the Nama 
maintained a lower profile in public discourse concerning reparations. Therefore, a separate study solely on the 
Nama and the specific political obstacles they have faced over the last century and post-independent Namibia 
would be valuable. 
41 Kössler, Namibia and Germany: Negotiating the Past, 1.  
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Therefore chapter two will address the politics in naming genocide, and describe the events of 1904-
1908 in greater details to demonstrate that what occurred in Namibia during German colonialism to the 
Herero and Nama is genocide. Furthermore, it will highlight the dire consequences of genocide and the 
inherited deprivations of the affected communities in order to understand and necessitate reparations 
claims. Thereafter, it will explore the political journey in which these events were eventually accepted 
as genocide by the international community, and by Germany, and how it was internalised by other 
Namibian actors including liberation parties in the second half of the century.   
 
This approach towards the politics of recognition is infused by Andrew Woolford and Stefan Wolejszo’s 
(2006) discussions on the various political factors that shaped the reparation movements following 
WWII. The authors critically compare the success of Jewish reparations claims and the initial failures 
of the Roma and Sinti reparations claims from the Federal Republic of Germany, using the Critical 
Victimology Approach.42 For the purpose of this chapter, the Critical Victimology Approach will be 
employed to not analyse the reparations movement, but the early formation of Herero Nationalism that 
sought restoration. Reparative Justice, which will be addressed in the third chapter, was not victim-
centric in the decades following the Herero/Nama Genocide.  Critical Victimology examines the role 
of politics that shape material and social conditions under which some victim movements successfully 
gain acknowledgement of their suffering while others are ignored, and how successful narratives can 
be translated into policies of redress.43 Woolford and Wolejszo highlight ‘political openings and social 
conditions’, as a factor which plays a pivotal role in victim group organisation and their success.44 This 
includes victim groups’ access to resources and the historical context in which these groups operate. 
Furthermore, ‘discursive openings’ is a political factor that shapes “interpretive frameworks and trauma 
narratives developed by collective actors”.45 For example, the Nuremberg trial “succeeded in educating 
                                                          
42 Andrew Woolford and Stefan Wolejszo, ‘Collecting on Moral Debts: Reparations for the Holocaust and 
Pořajmos,’ Law & Society Review, Volume 40, Issue 4 (2006): 874.  
43 Ibid, 874.  
44 Ibid, 888.  
45 Ibid, 893. 
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the German populace about Nazi crimes and initiating a slow developing discursive opening.”46 These 
may also include literature, other cultural outlets, and scholarship that spread and validate victim 
narratives, reaching an audience that this narrative can resonate with. Therefore, colonialism will play 
a central role in answering this question – how are victims of genocide defined? – arguing that 
colonialism not only permitted some genocides, but also created a context in which victims of colonial 
atrocities did not receive full recognitions. This draws consideration to ‘forgotten’ or unrecognised 
genocide victims who did not have the right social and political conditions to be recognised as victims 
worthy of redress. Furthermore, acknowledgement of genocide is not only a necessary step towards 
reparations claims, but forms part of Reparative Justice.  
 
The second question asks how have reparations evolved over the last century in its nature, intentions 
and practices, and how do these elements feature in the Herero reparations claims? Chapter three 
outlines Reparative Justice, which falls under the pillars of Restorative Justice and Corrective Justice, 
a victim centric approach that repairs damages of injustices.47 Therefore, requests by victim groups are 
more in line with Reparative Justice, opposed to proposals or ‘solutions’ put forward by perpetrators, 
especially if there is no prior formal engagement between perpetrator and victim. Therefore, requests 
articulated by the Herero will be considered, and how Germany responds to reparation claims in light 
of their responsibility to acknowledge, apologise and listen to the grievances and needs of the victim 
groups. Specific to this case study, debates around reparations to descendants of historical injustices in 
a post-colonial context will be explored in order to look at inherited inequalities and the inherited 
politics that continue to shape the post-colonial relationship between Germany and Namibia. It is worth 
noting that this is not a moral philosophy paper, although Reparative Justice does reside in larger moral 
debates, nor does it aim to validate the legality of reparations claims.48 This thesis will focus rather on 
the different practices of reparations – symbolic and material practices – that are applicable to the 
                                                          
46 Woolford & Wolejszo, ‘Collecting on Moral Debts: Reparations for the Holocaust and Pořajmos,’ 894. 
47 Johnstone, Restorative Justice: Ideas, Values, Debates, 1. 
48 Jeremy Sarkin’s 2009 work addresses the legal validity of Herero reparations claims from the German 
government.  
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reparations claims that have been put forward by Namibian actors and key scholars, and discuss how 
politics shape reparation victim group mobilisation and how Germany as a former coloniser takes on 
this responsibility. Furthermore, although colonialism and post-colonialism play a central role in the 
politics of acknowledging reparations claims for colonial genocide, this paper is not embedded in 
arguments for reparations for colonialism, rather for reparations for genocide in which the colonial and 
post-colonial context shapes the politics of reparations claims.   
 
The third chapter simultaneously addresses the next question: how are reparations acquired? This 
question will further embed the case study into the political domain, arguing that reparations is a 
political process in which acknowledgement of victimisation and warranted redress are demanded 
and/or negotiated between actors in which different levels of power reside. Furthermore, given the 
social conditions of colonialism, post-colonial politics continue to undermine Herero/Nama reparations 
claims. Colonial amnesia and denialism will be demonstrated in Germany’s early responses to Herero 
reparations claims that formally began in 1995, post-independence. Germany’s foreign policy did not 
acknowledge the genocide, furthermore claims for reparations continued to be refuted and replaced with 
development aid. The question – how are reparations acquired – will continue to be deliberated in 
chapter four, which addresses politics of reparations post-2006, when the Namibian government 
changed its national policy on genocide and its foreign policy on reparations with Germany. This 
chapter will attempt to break down the politics within the Herero group, that have influenced two 
strategies in the reparations movements – state-to-state negotiations and a class action lawsuit against 
Germany. Furthermore, this chapter will address the German government’s position of power in their 
responses to the two Namibian approaches in terms of respectful conduct, acknowledgement and setting 
the agenda on how to address the past. Although Germany’s position changed in 2015 with the official 
acknowledgment of the Herero/Nama Genocide and engagement in state dialogue with Namibia, this 
thesis explores how traces of denialism of responsibility continue to shape Germany’s approach to 
reparation claims.  
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Secondary literature on the history of the Herero/Nama genocide, the reparations movement, including 
broader literature on Reparative Justice Theory, feature in this thesis. However primary interviews with 
some of the key Herero figures in the reparation movement have been conducted in order to substantiate 
recent events – state-to-state negotiations and the lawsuit in the New York District Court. For the 
purpose of this thesis, Doctor Zedekia Ngavirue49, the Namibian Special Envoy on Genocide and 
Reparations, was interviewed. As the Special Envoy, Ngavirue represents the Namibian government’s 
agenda to negotiate issues around genocide, apology and reparations with the German government, and 
acts as the counterpart of the German Special Envoy. Professor Phanuel Kaapama forms part of the 
Namibian Special Envoys Technical Committee. Kaapama is a political science professor at the 
University of Namibia (UNAM) and was approached by the Deputy Prime Minister to form part of the 
Namibian negotiating team.50 Professor Peter Katjavivi51 is the Speaker of the National Assembly of 
the Republic of Namibia since 2015. Given that the Namibian parliament adopted the 2006 Motion on 
Genocide, it is within Katjavivi’s mandate to ensure that the motion is implemented, including follow 
ups and to communicate with members of the German parliament in order to guarantee that the 
Namibian mandate is understood. Lastly, Uazuva Kaumbi is the spokesperson of the OTA under the 
Paramount Chief Vekuii Rukoro. While the first three participants are in support of the Special Envoy’s 
proceedings, Kaumbi represents the voice of some Herero traditional leaders who support the 
OGF/NGTC’s ongoing lawsuit in New York District Court.  
 
These interviews shed light on two spheres of politics – national and international politics. This thesis 
will highlight and explore national politics in order to define the positions of power of two different 
collective actors in Namibia: a democratically elected government with a jurisdiction over all 
Namibians, and the other being more in line with traditional authorities of the affected group. Woolford 
                                                          
49 Dr Ngavirue was previously the ambassador to the EU and has served as a Namibian diplomat before retiring 
in 2003.  
50 Interview with Professor Phanuel Kaapama, September 3, 2018.  
51 Professor Katjavivi served as the Namibian ambassador to Germany between 2006 and 2008, when the 2006 
Motion was passed. Furthermore, it was in his capacity to officially deliver the Motion to the German Foreign 
Minister, which was the start of the reparations process between the two governments.   
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and Wolejszo draw attention to politics within a victim group, which often is not led by a unified voice.52 
This thesis highlights the schisms between these two ‘camps’, however will attempt to break down the 
binary approach of Hereros vs. government, and highlight the two camps within the Herero community 
– the Maherero group and Riruako group53 - that relate differently to government. The focus will shift 
to how Germany responds to these two ongoing approaches. This refers to international politics and 
Germany’s attitude, as a former coloniser, that continues to set the terms of ‘addressing the past’ and 
responds to claims superficially. Lastly, this case study will be considered in an international context in 
which former colonisers are responding to various requests from the former colonised concerning unjust 
pasts.  
 
2. Genocide and Colonialism 
2.1. Politics of Defining Genocide: Holocaust and Forgotten Genocides  
  
The UN Convention on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect (Genocide Convention) 
defines genocide as the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group,”54 through the acts of killing members of that group, causing bodily or mental harm, deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or 
in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group.55 The term ‘genocide’ was coined by Raphaël Lemkin56, a Jewish 
Polish lawyer, and first appeared in his Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Laws of Occupation. Analysis 
of Government. Proposals for Redress (1944). This term derives from the Greek genos for race or tribe, 
                                                          
52 Woolford &Wolejszo, ‘Collecting on Moral Debts: Reparations for the Holocaust and Pořajmos,’ 877. 
53 Hamrick & Duschinski, ‘Enduring injustices: Memory politics and Namibia’s genocide reparations 
movement,’ 9.  
54 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951. 
http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-
crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20o
f%20Genocide.pdf 
55 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951.  
56 Lemkin specialised in international criminal law and fiscal law during the persecutions of the Jewish 
communities in Eastern Europe before WWII. 
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and the Latin cide translating to killing.57 Although this term arose during the course of WWII and was 
a response to the mass persecution of the European Jewish communities by Nazi Germany, Lemkin 
acknowledged that the act of genocide was not new and could be traced throughout world history. 
Lemkin expanded his idea of genocide, usually equated to mass killings, to include the destruction of a 
group’s ‘genius’, which covered cultural vandalism, destruction of property, obstruction of procreation 
and economic discrimination to envision a multifaceted approach to the extermination of a specific 
group.58 When Lemkin published Axis Rule, his underlying argument was that wars were waged against 
armies and not civilian populations, as highlighted in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. 
Furthermore Lemkin proposed that Nazi leaders be persecuted for their war crimes and that genocide 
be recognised as an international crime.59  
 
Lemkin campaigned at the UN for the adoption of the Genocide Convention during 1946 and 1948, 
after which it was finally adopted after several political obstacles. John Cooper, who writes an 
autobiography on Lemkin using the lawyer and historian’s unpublished works and personal journals, 
has described Lemkin’s efforts at the UN as a single-handed campaign as no sovereign government 
championed his proposal.60 Lemkin’s proposal highlighted the cultural diversity in the world that all 
added value to a universal civilisation. Based on Lemkin’s personal journals, Britain, Russia, and other 
Western democracies, of which many were colonial powers, opposed the draft convention as many 
governments would be guilty of genocide, including colonial excursions.61 Supposedly, the US and UK 
governments had issued private orders to their UN delegations “to bury the convention”.62 Furthermore, 
this anxiety was noticeable among members of the Commonwealth with indigenous populations, such 
as Canada, South Africa and New Zealand, who voted for the deletion of the clause.63 While the Western 
                                                          
57 United Nations, 2017. United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 
Definitions: http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.html  
58 Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention, 18-19.  
59 Ibid, 273.  
60 Ibid, 93.  
61 Ibid, 103.  
62 Douglas Irvin-Erickson, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania Press, 
2017), 157-158.  
63 Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention, 158.  
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bloc argued for the deletion of cultural genocide, the Eastern bloc argued for the deletion of political 
genocide – the persecution of groups based on their political allegiance. After amendments, the 
Genocide Convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 and became an instrument 
that focused solely on physical genocide.64 The Genocide Convention was encoded in international law 
in 1951 after it was ratified by twenty member states. The emergence of Latin American member states 
assisted in this outcome.65 Since 2018, it has been ratified by 149 UN member states.  
 
The Holocaust is not the first genocide, and Lemkin’s understanding of the crime encompassed the 
attempted exterminations of groups throughout history, including some colonial atrocities. Lemkin’s 
unpublished The History of Genocide dated genocides back to the 16th Century – genocide perpetrated 
by the Mongols committed against the Bohemian Protestants. Lemkin’s case studies included slavery, 
colonial expansion and military conquests.66 As such, his concept of genocide covered colonial 
genocides and a number of other pivotal genocides – the Herero Genocide (1904-1908), the Armenian 
Genocide (1915), the Stalinist inspired famine in Ukraine, the Roma and Sinti extermination during the 
Holocaust – however not every chapter was completed at the time of his death, 1959. Dominik J. 
Schaller argues that colonialism played a central role in Lemkin’s notion of genocide, and that “it was 
the study of colonial mass murders that provided him with a conceptual framework for analysing the 
German policy of occupation and extermination in Eastern Europe during World War II.”67 However, 
the Holocaust has generated a ‘uniqueness debate’ in which some scholars deliberate “whether or not it 
is even possible to compare the Jewish Holocaust with other genocides.”68 Woolford and Wolejszo 
demonstrate that the Jewish Holocaust has become the prototypical genocide of which all other 
genocides are measured against. The authors argue that although the Jewish articulations of reparations 
have given platforms for other victims to articulate their grievances and demand justice, it has also 
                                                          
64 Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention. 
65 Ibid, 276. 
66 Ibid, 236-238. 
67 Dominik J. Schaller, ‘Raphael Lemkin’s view of European colonial rule in Africa: between condemnation and 
admiration,’ Journal of Genocide Research, 7, 4 (2005): 531.  
68 Woolford & Wolejszo, ‘Collecting on Moral Debts: Reparations for the Holocaust and Pořajmos,’ 881.  
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dulled other demands for reparations as other genocides are regarded as ‘lesser genocides’ in 
comparison to the Jewish Holocaust. The authors warn that to compare genocides is arguably unethical, 
as one falls into the trap of constructing death toll counts and percentages of populations killed.69 Each 
genocide is unique and catastrophic to the affected group. 
 
2.2. Colonial Genocide: the Herero and Nama Genocide 1904-1908 
 
It has become internationally accepted that the events of 1904-1908 in Namibia constituted genocide. 
Jeremy Sarkin (2009 and 2011), Olusoga and Erichsen (2010), and Gewald (2004), demonstrate that 
this genocide was state sanctioned by Imperial Germany. Gewald notes that the personal involvement 
of the Kaiser signalled the highest authorisation and endorsement “for acts committed in the name of 
Imperial Germany.”70 Sarkin (2011), similar to Olusoga and Erichsen, demonstrate the Kaiser’s intent 
to and approval of exterminating the Herero through his appointment of a ruthless general known for 
obliterating populations in other colonies, and his complacent silence when his general read out his 
extermination order.71 The genocide took place during the Herero War, which began in 1904 as a result 
of built up tension between the Herero and German settlers as colonial tactics to gain control over 
GSWA was laden with injustices towards the Herero and Nama.  
 
The Herero War was spurred by drastic loss of land, cattle and livestock, which conflicted with central 
parts of Herero cultural values. This was done not only through ‘fair’ sales72 but through laws that the 
                                                          
69 Woolford & Wolejszo, ‘Collecting on Moral Debts: Reparations for the Holocaust and Pořajmos,’ 883. 
70 Jan-Bart Gewald, ‘Imperial Germany and the Herero of Southern Africa: Genocide and the Quest for 
Recompense,’ in Genocide, War Crimes and the West: History & Complicity, ed. Adam Jones (London: Zed 
Book Ltd, 2004), 60.  
71 Jeremy Sarkin, Germany’s Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His 
Soldiers. 
72 Land sales were known to bring large fortunes to the Herero and Nama chiefs – Maherero and Witbooi 
included. However, some land treaties had unjust payments and on some occasions taken under pretence, i.e. 
forging signatures.  
(Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 127.) 
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German Colonial Administration introduced.73 Some figures suggest that by 1902 the Herero had 
managed to retain 46,000 heads of cattle of 100,000 from the 1880s.74 In addition, under German 
settlers, Hereros were victim to rape75, prejudiced violence,76 and the introduction of corporal 
punishment.77 Furthermore, Africans had to endure a racially biased legal system that often led to no 
justice and punishment for bearing a false testimony.78 This build-up in tension led to an uprising in 
1904 under Paramount Chief Samuel Maharero against the dominance of German male settlers, 
reflected in the Herero War tactics to narrow their attacks to German male settlers. 
 
After a few military blows to German forces and pride, the German Colonial Administration alerted 
Germany that the Herero were attacking German civilains including women and children in order to 
stir an urgent response.79 Ideas and images of a ‘savage’ race were depicted and conveyed in messages 
and propaganda art in Germany in order to justify the response that the Kaiser had in mind.80 The 
response was the appointment of a hardened military commander, General von Trotha, who had “forged 
a reputation for ruthlessness”81 and the deployment of German troops consisting of 2,000 soldiers to 
defend Germany’s colony and settlers.82 As the Kaiser’s preferred choice, von Trotha was permitted 
                                                          
73 This included fining natives for grazing their cattle on German land, and most often through confiscation of 
the cattle. 
74 Sarkin, Germany’s Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers, 72. 
75 There were only 19 white women for every 100 white male settlers.  
(Sarkin, Germany’s Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers, 89.) 
76 “The result [of racism] was a wave of violence and abuse…Official records of beatings, rapes and murders 
committed in the years up to 1904 speak of a colony slipping out of control…The most commonly reported 
incidents were beatings . Many of these attacks were viewed by their perpetrators as semi-official acts of 
corporal punishment.”  
(Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 117.)  
77 Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 116.    
78 Ibid, 119.  
79 Ibid, 130.  
80 Ibid, 130-131.  
81General von Trotha had garnered this reputation in German East Africa (Tanzania) colonial war – and 
arguably genocide – and in China after the Boxer Rebellion through mass executions and hangings as well as 
burning down villages with occupants still inside at times and clashed in views with the German East Africa 
Governor. The same would happen in Namibia, where Governor Leutwein resigned after the extreme response 
that was to befall on the Herero community, believing that the Herero community may still have a place in the 
colony. 
(Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 135.)  
82 Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 134.  
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supreme command in both military and civil affairs, and urged that the war end “by fair means or foul.”83 
Furthermore, the Colonial Department financed the war with 585 million marks, which was at the 
general’s disposal.84 Some Herero chiefs, including Maherero, believed that peace negotiations were 
possible after they had demonstrated their strength, and despite recommendations by some of von 
Trotha’s officers to enter peace negotiations, the general responded with a powerful military attack on 
approximately 22,000 Herero soldiers and civilians, at the Waterberg Mountain on 11 August 1904, 
known as the Ohamakari battle.  
  
The Ohamakari battle resulted in a devastating blow to the Herero population. A few thousands of 
Herero that managed to escape were forced to seek refuge in the Omaheke Desert, where many perished 
of hunger and dehydration. Whilst German troops hunted and killed survivors, von Trotha ordered that 
no surrenders be accepted. This was officiated six weeks after Ohamakari, on 3 October 1904, when 
von Trotha read out an extermination order outlining that the Hereros were no longer welcomed in 
GSWA, ordered to leave the land, and those who remain within German borders “whether found armed 
or unarmed, with or without cattle, will be shot. I shall not accept any more women and children, I shall 
drive them back to their people [Omaheke Desert] otherwise I shall order them to be shot. Signed: The 
Great General of the Mighty Kaiser, von Trotha”.85 Whether the Kaiser had ordered this extermination 
cannot be confirmed, however based on von Trotha’s previous colonial excursions in South East Africa 
(Tanzania), the crushing of the Boxer Rebellion and his reputation he garnered for ruthless tactics on 
‘rebels’, Sarkin argues that the Kaiser expected this conduct to be replicated in Namibia.86 Two days 
after this order, von Trotha wrote to the Chief of the Army General Staff that he “neither can nor will 
come to terms with these people [Herero] without express orders from His Majesty the Emperor and 
King, it is essential that all sections of the [Herero] nation be subjected to rather stern treatment.”87 
                                                          
83 Sarkin, Germany’s Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers, 195.  
84 Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 142.  
85 Sarkin, Germany’s Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers, 110.   
86 Ibid, 194.  
87 Ibid, 195.  
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Therefore, the Kaiser’s passivity to von Trotha’s war extermination order arguably highlights that the 
German leader approved, if not supported it.  
 
What followed was a hunt campaign for all Hereros88, including twenty to 30,000 Hereros who had 
remained uninvolved throughout the uprising and were easier targets.89 These hunts were at times 
recorded as ‘battles’ in Official German History, however had no casualties and deaths of German 
soldiers.90 Given the immense expense of this extermination campaign, and the fear of Germany’s 
reputation being tarnished, the Kaiser was advised in 1905 to allow the surrender of Hereros in hiding 
and placed them in ‘confined areas’ – concentration camps – where they would be used as labour to 
begin mending GSWA’s economy.91 Concentration camps was not a new concept,92 and the erection of 
five main concentration camps permitted soldiers to begin accepting prisoners of war. Thousands of 
Hereros emerged from hiding, some described by a missionary pastor as resembling skeletons covered 
in skin. Those in concentration camps were to work and receive payment in food – 500 grams of rice 
for men, and less for women and children, at times even half the rations.93 Hereros in these camps were 
subjected to rape, forced labour, mal-nutrition, diseases with no medical attention and extreme climate 
conditions. The Swakopmund concentration camp estimated that 40 percent of its prisoners died in the 
first four months and that new prisoner usually did not survive the first ten months of captivity. 94 Some 
records suggest that the extent of this suffering was known in the chains of command in Windhoek and 
Berlin, further signifying that the systematic killing of colonial civilains was state condoned. 
 
                                                          
88 Some soldiers’ journals captured their interpretation of the Extermination Order to “shoot, kill, hang. 
Whatever you liked. Old or young. Men, women, children.”  
(Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 152.)+ 
89 Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 152.  
90 Ibid, 154. 
91 Sarkin, Germany’s Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers, 229. 
92 Concentration camps were used in the Boer War (1899-1902), where the British had forced an estimate of 
thirty thousand Boers (mostly women and children) and over one hundred thousand black and coloured 
Africans. Spanish rulers in Cuba (1896) had also made use of concentration camps in response to a revolt.  
(Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 160.)  
93 Ibid, 165. 
94 Ibid, 168. 
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After realising Germany’s intention to fully dominate GSWA, the Nama uprising,95 began in early 
October 1904 under Nama Chief Hendrik Witbooi. The Nama issued a declaration, stating that all 
German women and children, including men without weapons who chose to leave, be transported to 
Lüderitz Bay unharmed. In April 1905, von Trotha responded with a declaration: “The Great and mighty 
German Emperor is prepared to pardon the Hottentot [Nama] people and has ordered that those who 
surrender voluntarily will be spared…those who refuse to surrender will suffer the same fate suffered 
by the Herero people.”96 This has since been acknowledged by Herero and Nama leaders as a second 
extermination order97, and although von Trotha voiced the acceptance of ‘surrenders’, their acceptance 
would lead to the systematic killing of the warring Nama clans. After several blows to the rebelling 
Nama communities and German troops, the surrender of Namas was welcomed and they were permitted 
to build small settlements with some livestock outside a small German town called Gibeon. Rumours 
of such treatment spread and large groups of Namas began to surrender at Gibeon in the following 
weeks, believing that they would not share the same fate as the Herero. Unbeknownst to them, more 
concentration camps north of Windhoek and along the coast were being erected for the Nama, who were 
transferred there in early 1906.  
 
The Namas – and some imprisoned Damara and San people98 – faced the same treatment of abuse, mal-
nutrition, disease and extremely cold climates along the coast and were “systematically worked to 
death”.99 Furthermore, in order to support German physical anthropology and racial science that was 
becoming increasingly racist in the belief of racial hierarchies,100 and even condoned colonial 
                                                          
95 At the start of the Herero uprising, Maherero had written a letter to Witbooi with the hopes of forming an 
African anti-colonial alliance against European settlers, however the messenger was intercepted by the 
Rehoboth Basters leader and never reached Witbooi. When the Nama began their uprising, hopes of an effective 
anti-colonial alliance were reduced by the military blow at Waterberg.   
(Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 174-175.)  
96 Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 185.  
97 The Nama and Ovaherero Traditional Leaders, Joint Position Paper from the Nama and Ovaherero People on 
the Issue of Genocide and Reparations. 
98 Elke Zuern, ‘Memorial politics: challenging the dominant party’s narrative in Namibia’, Modern African 
Studies, 50, 3 (2012): 503.  
99 Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 215.  
100 Dan Stone, ‘White men with low moral standards? German anthropology and the Herero genocide’, in 
Colonialism and Genocide, ed. A. Dirk Moses and Dan Stone (London: Taylor & Francis Group Ltd, 2007).  
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behaviour, many hundreds of Herero, Nama, Damara and San skulls were transported to scientists in 
Germany for ‘scientific’ research.101 Such beliefs in race science and eugenics – the classification of 
races which required a large data base of human remains – was not limited to Germany and was ‘rife’ 
in Western Europe since mid-nineteenth century.102 Furthermore, Herero and Nama land and cattle were 
seized by the German Colonial Administrator after the Kaiser signed an Imperial Decree (1905) to 
expropriate all previously owned Herero land and sold tracts of land to German and Afrikaner settlers.103 
This ‘confiscation order’ was extended to the Nama in 1907. 104 Before the start of the uprising, white 
settlers owned 338 farms, a figure which increased to 1331 white-owned farms in 1913.105 In 1907, a 
policy was enforced, stating that the Herero could no longer own cattle which was a direct attack on 
their cultural identity.106  
 
The concentration camps closed in 1908, and the Colonial Administration reported that of the 15,000 
Herero and 2,000 Namas in captivity, more than half had died.107 There have been various estimates 
around the number of deaths from the wars, the civilian-hunt campaigns and the concentration camps.  
Approximately 13,000 of 20,000 Nama were alive in Namibia in 1908. Of those who belonged to the 
clans that revolted and were imprisoned in concentration camps, ten percent survived.108 Approximately 
16, 363 of almost 100,000 Herero were alive in 1908, of which 5,373 were children.109  In total, the 
Herero people lost almost 80 percent of their entire population, although almost 1,000 Hereros had 
managed to escape into modern day Botswana after the Ohamakari battle.110 The survivors’ economic 
and cultural wealth had been stripped away and many were reduced to wage seekers, having had their 
                                                          
101 In fact, “female prisoners were forced to boil the severed heads of their own people [including of loved ones 
and relatives] and scrape the flesh, sinews and ligaments off the skulls with shards of broken glass”.  
(Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 224.)  
102 Kössler, Namibia and Germany: Negotiating the Past, 274. 
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108 Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 229. 
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(Olusoga & Erichsen& Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 230.) 
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sense of community and traditions lost.111 By 1912 Hereros were legally permitted to own and breed 
livestock again, however almost ninety percent of all their males were employed in the colonial 
economy.112 Herero leadership and their people were “labourers, subservient to the military, farmers, 
mine-owners and railway authorities who sought to control their every move.”113 The Herero and Nama 
endured all these events before the occupation of Namibia by South Africa and the introduction of 
Apartheid in 1948.  
 
The Herero/Nama Genocide and land confiscation continue to impact the affected communities’ 
political positions, socio-economic status and cultural identity in present day Namibia. For example, 
the drastic reduction in population size has placed some of the Herero and Nama leaders at a political 
disadvantage in a democratic post-independent Namibia. Sarkin notes that there have been some 
estimations that suggest that the Herero would have been four or five times larger in population count 
if the genocide had not occurred.114 Uazuva Kaumbi, who is the official spokesperson for the OTA, 
highlights that “numbers and democracy means power,” and wonders what the Herero nation could 
have become had the genocide not taken place, “maybe it would have been SWAPO and a different 
party, competing… Now we are a very small minority, politically more or less insignificant.” 115 This, 
as will be demonstrated, has also affected the political position of the OTA under Riruako and his 
successor Rukoro to negotiate reparations. Linked to the reduction of population size is the loss of land, 
which was a direct result of the genocide. The loss of ancestral land continue to impact the cultural 
identity and wealth of the Herero. Much of the seized land was sold to white farmers a century ago, 
who continue to benefit from this injustice. Sarkin (2009) highlights that white Namibians account for 
approximately one percent of the population, however own 4,128 farms of 6,300 that are on commercial 
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land.116 Furthermore, this amount constitutes about 70 percent of the most productive agricultural 
land.117 Not only is this a reflection and a perpetuation of the economic inequalities in Namibia, but 
constitutes a great symbolic loss for the Herero. Kaumbi speaks of Herero places of worship, one of 
which is Ohamakari, “which was the most symbolic place…that farm is owned by a German guy…we 
need to ask for permission from this guy to go visit our ancestors.”118 Therefore, the injustices of the 
genocide continue to be felt by the Herero groups, furthermore, continues to reinforce their 
victimisation.  
 
2.3. Politics of Acknowledging the Herero/Nama Genocide  
 
Woolford and Wolejszo demonstrate that although Jewish, Roma and Sinti groups experienced similar 
genocidal state crimes of Nazi Germany, the Jewish Holocaust survivors had a more opportune political 
opening, social condition and discursive opening. Firstly, an educated Jewish diaspora had access to 
resources to lobby for and influence Western governments to support reparations claims before WWII 
ended.119 Secondly, the defeat of Nazi Germany placed the perpetrator in a place of international 
condemnation and prosecuted in the Nuremberg Trial.120 This further assisted in establishing a 
discursive narrative of war crimes that were judged as guilty and inhumane. In addition, the authors 
speculate that the Republic of Germany was in a position to actively separate itself from its Nazi past 
and be accepted back by Western powers. Therefore acknowledging the Jewish Holocaust, which had 
mobilised resonating support, would be a ‘symbolic step’ to re-joining the ‘family’ of Western 
nations.121 The Roma and Sinti on the other hand did not reach the same level of acknowledgement, and 
therefore redress, following WWII because they lacked the political resources and the international 
networks to produce wider resonance for their cause. Furthermore, the Republic of Germany argued 
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that they were persecuted for criminal, rather than racial reasons.122 Therefore, no political benefits was 
likely to come to Germany from acknowledging and addressing Roma and Sinti atrocities, which would 
have had to operate solely on a moral level. 123 Consequently, the authors argue that acknowledging 
genocides that warrant redress is a political process which are determined by social contexts, resources 
and a supportive international audience.  
 
With this analogy in mind, the recognition of the Herero/Nama genocide can be situated into a political 
and discursive colonial context. The events of 1904-1908 have proven to be a state sanctioned genocide 
even though the term had not been defined as a unique crime until 1944 onwards. However, Sarkin 
(2009) argues that Germany’s response to target all Hereros – men, women, children and the elder – 
including groups that had not rebelled, and the rebelling Nama clans, was an international crime at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.124 Germany’s response exceeded what was condoned as fair war 
tactics in the Hague Conventions, which similar to Lemkin’s view outlined that wars were between 
armies and not civilians and that prisoners of war remain unharmed. The events of 1904-1908 has been 
previously referred to as the Herero War, however considering the uneven blows to the involved 
populations and the exponential response of the Kaiser, one can hardly defend the hunting of famished 
civilians and their systematic killings after their surrender simply as ‘war’. The politics of 
acknowledging this genocide will be broken down into three audiences: the international community 
(UN); the Hereros and Namas (and other Namibian groups, including German descendants); and 
Germany.  
 
Formal reparations requests and demands for acknowledgement to Germany that began post-1990 did 
not appear in a vacuum since the genocide. Woolford and Wolejszo explain that in contexts of intense 
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oppressions where resources and audiences are not easily accessible, “one must be careful not to mistake 
the absence of exhibited agency for the absence of agency.”125 Under the social conditions of 
colonialism under Germany and later South Africa, the likeliness of the Herero leadership reaching an 
audience with which their narrative could resonate with were improbable. The authors argue against 
blaming victims for failure to press claims, rather “in times of intense oppression, these resources of 
resistance may exist only in embryonic or latent form.”126 Although ‘reparations’ as a legal and moral 
obligation was not articulated by the victim group closely following the end of the genocide,127 the 
Herero chiefs were vocal around restoration of land and the right to govern themselves as a nation, 
applicable to their settler colonial context. Therefore, although reparations became a legal demand post-
independence, these earlier attempts for acknowledgement and restoration are the foundation of which 
the reparation movement under the OTA is built on.  
 
The lengthy timeframe for the international community to acknowledge the Herero/Nama Genocide 
takes place in a context where colonialism continued to be an international norm and decolonisation, 
that began post 1945, came with little ‘redress’. Furthermore, Namibia was one of the last African 
countries to receive independence in 1990. Therefore, any discursive and political opening for 
articulation of grievances and its translations into policies of redress/restoration were miniscule. Seven 
years after the end of the genocide, 1915, the British South Africans defeated the German army in 
Namibia during WWI in a successful Campaign for GSWA.128  British officers began assembling 
factual material around the treatment of ‘colonial subjects’ under Imperial German in an attempt to 
strengthen the British Empire’s claims to German colonies.129 Information was collected from the 
German archives in Namibia, and detailed statements taken under oath by surviving Namibians of the 
horrific treatment of war, labour camps and its aftermaths were taken in the hopes of redress and return 
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of land, which according to Gewald, the British had promised in 1914 in order to lure Herero soldiers 
into assisting with the invasion in 1915.130 This resulted in the publication of the 1918 Report on the 
Natives of South West Africa and their Treatment by Germany, known as the ‘Blue Book’. The Blue 
Book concluded that Germany was unfit to govern colonies due to severe treatment of the ‘natives’, 
showing that this treatment was condemned internationally.  
 
This infamous Blue Book assisted in the discursive opening by capturing the narratives of the victim 
groups, however in relation to settler colonial politics, this was short lived. Germany’s rather 
unsuccessful retaliation was the ‘White Book’, a detailed account of British activities in their colonies. 
Gewald questions the sincerity behind these books and whether the dignity and lives of the colonial 
subjects were the core concern, or most likely, the books were political ploys against one another in a 
world war setting. 131 Representatives of the German settler party, the Deutsche Bund in Südestafrika, 
campaigned for the abolition of the Blue Book, claiming that it was merely a ‘war instrument’ and 
“consciously denied the recorded role of German settlers and soldiers in the Herero genocide.”132 With 
the abolition of the Blue Book (1926) by South African authorities, the discursive opening for the 
Herero was not only closed, but validated the German narrative. In order to solidify white settler unity 
in Namibia – German, British and Afrikaners – destroying the negative image of Germany and its 
settlers would be in the interest for everyone – except African groups. 133134  Gewald concludes that the 
losses and inhumane treatment of the Herero and Nama during the colonial genocide were “dismissed 
and forgotten in the interests of white cooperation.”135 As a result, the lack of hope for their narrative 
acknowledgement is reflected in relative silence of the Herero following 1926.136 
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Similarly, the lack of political opening for restoration is easily noted in the context of settler colonialism. 
The Herero began formally requesting restoration for losses as early as 1919, a year after the Blue Book 
publication, when hopes for land restoration were ripe. The Herero leaders submitted a letter to the 
British Governor General of South Africa requesting for the return of some land after the defeat of 
Germany, so that “we [the Herero] can live as a nation and where our families can grow into a nation.”137  
This request was rejected under the political context of settler colonialism, so that the British, Afrikaners 
and Germans could continue to inhabit prime Namibian land. The Hereros inhabited less arable 
reserves, which were also scattered, and the Herero as a nation could not be restored. Therefore, hopes 
and attempts for restoration were evident, however the politics of recognition in a context of white 
colonialism in Namibia – and the continent – offered little persuasion for Germany or German settlers 
to officially acknowledge this past, let alone restore it. This politics of recognition was further reinforced 
by colonialism on a global scale in which most Western powers were guilty of colonial atrocities.  
 
A political and discursive opening was ignored shortly after the establishment of the UN in 1945, a 
period that spoke of Universal Rights and the conceptualisation of ‘genocide’. During Lemkin’s 
campaign for the Genocide Convention at the UN, the Herero Chief’s Council (HCC) under Paramount 
Chief Hosea Kutako began petitioning at the UN to oppose the incorporation of Namibia into South 
Africa at the UN in 1946. This was done through Reverend Michael Scott, a British anti-colonial 
activist. Scott’s personal engagement with the Herero leaders in 1947 and the events of the genocide 
shaped his understanding of inequalities under colonialism in Namibia and its link to the genocide – “a 
people driven off their land, slaughtered, banished to live in barren homelands, and still with no 
rights.”138 Scott was granted a formal hearing at the UN in 1949 to oppose the incorporation into South 
Africa, and during this he re-introduced the Herero Genocide139 to the world, highlighting its persisting 
consequences on the affected communities. This occurred a year after the 1948 Genocide Convention, 
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with the recent memory of the Holocaust. Scott made an explicit link between Nazi’s atrocities and the 
colonial atrocities of 1904-1908, highlighting aspects of genocide.140 Furthermore, he noted that 
inequalities continued under white South Africans, who had lured natives into their WWI Campaign for 
GSWA under false promises of land restoration that was later denied in favour of white settler unity.141  
 
As noted before, Lemkin acknowledged events in the Herero War as genocide. Not only did the lawyer 
have a historical and intellectual interest in the Herero Genocide, Lemkin had an active interest before 
he began his History of Genocide. Reverend Scott had written to Lemkin on 9 June 1948, a few months 
before the Genocide Convention was adopted, where “Scott stated that ‘I informed the [Herero] chiefs 
how very good you had been in helping me get their opinions made known [among United Nations 
delegates] and they were very grateful indeed’”.142 In light of the link between colonialism and such 
atrocities, Lemkin was an advocate for the process of decolonisation. During the campaign for the 
Genocide Convention, the Herero Genocide was one of the atrocities that informed Lemkin’s desire to 
have colonial genocides acknowledged by the international community. The UN, however, did not 
acknowledge the Herero Genocide during this time, given the anxieties around colonialism and colonial 
genocide when establishing a convention that was so informed by the Jewish Holocaust. Olusoga and 
Erichsen argue that while many German scholars and Nazi leaders during WWII linked expansion into 
East Europe and its war of annihilation on ‘lesser’ populations to earlier colonial episodes, other 
European powers intentionally overlooked this colonial link when condemning the Holocaust as a result 
of ‘colonial amnesia’ which the authors have defined as “Europe’s propensity for ignoring or forgetting 
the colonial past.”143 Although statements began to shift from ‘Herero War’ to the ‘Herero massacre’ 
during the start of the campaign for Namibian independence, the UN only acknowledged this massacre 
as a genocide in 1985 in the UN Whitaker Report.144  
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Within this historical context tainted by Western colonial power, Germany has taken a lengthier 
timeframe to officially acknowledge the events of 1904-1908 as genocide. As will be explored in 
chapter four, as a defensive response to absolve Germany of legal responsibilities to owe reparations, 
German foreign policy previously avoided the term ‘genocide’. In 1989, Germany passed a resolution 
which acknowledged a ‘special historical responsibility’ to Namibia. However, Henning Melber (2017) 
points out that there was no mention of ‘genocide’ even though the UN acknowledged the Herero 
Genocide four years prior. Furthermore, the resolution made reference to the German-speaking 
community, which led Melber to consider that “German policy seemed more concerned with acts of the 
colonial settler perpetrators, than the fate of the victims or their descendants.”145  In June 2004, the 
German Parliament adopted the resolution ‘Remembering the victims of the colonial war in the then 
German South West Africa’.146 This was most likely a response to calls for reparations, which forced 
Germany’s focus to shift to the ‘victims of the colonial war’. However, Manfred Hinz highlights that 
this resolution completely avoided the terms ‘genocide’. Hinz further notes that German Foreign 
Affair’s policy of 2004 cautioned that any ‘compensation-relevant statement’ should be avoided.147  
 
In 2015, Germany created a stir when it officially acknowledged the Armenian Genocide of 1915 under 
the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish government, being held accountable by Armenian groups, were 
enraged by the hypocrisy and selectivity of the German government who had not yet acknowledged 
their own colonial genocide.148 The German media also questioned the hypocrisy of the German 
government. Germany officially acknowledged the genocide in German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 
speech in 2015 that admitted that what happened to the Herero constituted a genocide.149 This was 
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translated into official policy the following year.150 This statement was overdue, considering that the 
UN classified the Herero massacre as genocide 30 years before.151 The political interactions that 
contributed to Germany’s officially acknowledged genocide will be addressed in chapter four in greater 
detail. 
 
What this section has demonstrated is that defining genocide, and therefore officially acknowledging 
its victims, is a political process that fits into international and local historical contexts. Given the central 
position of the Jewish Holocaust in the formation of the international understanding of genocide – the 
prototypical genocide – other genocides have not received the same level of acknowledgement of 
victimhood and therefore their need for redress has been overshadowed. Each genocide is unique and 
contextual, furthermore any genocide, given its nature, indicates a devastating loss to a community 
including significant traumas and economic damages for survivors and their descendants should there 
be no form of redress. The political and discursive openings under contexts of unrelenting colonialism 
under Germany (until 1915) and South Africa (until 1990), shaped the drawn-out timeframe for affected 
communities to receive official acknowledgement. One reason that can explain this, is that the 
international community were amidst establishing decolonisation as an international norm over the 
course of the second half of the twentieth century. Namibia was one of the last African countries to 
receive independence, after which descendants of genocide immediately exercised their newly 
established political freedom to demand justice in the form of reparations. Kaumbi highlights that a 
vital process of reparations is acknowledgement, where Germany “admit[s] that it committed genocide 
and not try to sugar coat it with words like ‘atrocities’.”152  
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2.4. Genocide Shapes Herero Nationalism, Liberation and Restoration  
 
As mentioned, demands for reparations post-independence did not appear in a vacuum since the 
genocide. Although Kutako’s campaign at the UN that began in the late 1940s was not for 
‘reparations’153, the idea of restoration for the Herero and other Namibians was tied to the idea of 
independence, given that this context encompassed the first wave of decolonisation. Kaumbi ties in 
Herero Nationalism in which Herero chiefs “did not use…words like reparations, they were talking 
about getting land and restoring our dignity.”154 Kaumbi highlights that Herero Nationalism following 
the genocide, shaped the way in which the Herero leaders attempted to restore the Herero nation over 
the last century, including the earliest campaigns at the UN under Kutako that ultimately groomed Sam 
Nujoma, Namibia’s first democratic president.155 The Herero Chiefs Council (HCC) under Kutako was 
formed in 1945 and were the first to campaign at the UN through Reverend Scott. Many Namibians, 
including non-Hereros, shared Kutako’s vision to oppose foreign rule and actively petitioned at the UN, 
such as Mburumba Kerina156 (1956), on behalf of the HCC; Hans Beukes and Jariretundu Kozonwere 
(1959) sent to New York by the HCC with the intention of “becoming representatives of the future 
independent Namibia at the UN”157; Andimba Toivo ya Toivo (1958) and Nujoma (1960), both 
Owambo; and Nama leader Hendrik Samuel Witbooi and nephew Hendrik Witbooi (1958).158 During 
this time, these figures were more-or-less united under the idea of being separated from the Union 
Government in South Africa and its Apartheid policies that were introduced in 1948.  
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However, the creation of several liberation parties contributed to political tension concerning 
competitive ambitions to rule an independent Namibia. South West Africa National Union (SWANU) 
was founded in 1959, dominated by Herero ideologies of which loss of land during the Herero Genocide 
became a major mobilising factor to campaign for independence.159 SWAPO was founded in 1960 by 
Sam Nujoma, dominated by Owambo ideologies stemming from treatment of contract labourers under 
the South African regime. The HCC broke away from SWANU, where Kutako, Clemens Kapuuo and 
Mburumba Kerina founded the National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO) in 1964, which joined 
the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA; an alliance of groups that could collectively compete against 
SWAPO) in the 1907s.160 Kapuuo became Kutako’s successor as Paramount Chief in the OTA, followed 
by Riruako, who was president of the DTA until he led NUDO out of DTA in 2004.161  Riruako would 
be the first to formally request reparations from Germany. Although the genocide resonated with all 
parties’ nationalism, it was central to SWANU and NUDO’s, given their strong roots in Herero 
Nationalism. 
 
While independence was a common goal for the liberation parties, politics to gain recognition as 
Namibia’s sole representative caused tension amongst the parties. 162163 SWAPO was acknowledged as 
the sole authentic and representative of Namibia by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1975 
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and by the UN in 1976.164 Gewald argues that the different parties in the liberation movement used “the 
historical recollections of the Herero-German War as a political instrument to support and further their 
own ends.”165 The author suggests that SWAPO used these events as propaganda in order to further 
their cause for liberation, and that after independence, SWAPO “tried to ensure that Herero claims for 
reparation would remain muted or couched within the demands of the nation-state which they 
controlled.”166 The author argues that rivalry in the liberation struggle ran along tribal lines; SWAPO 
was dominated by the Owambo, and SWANU by the Herero.167 It is worth noting that SWANU and 
SWAPO were not restricted to tribal lines and that SWAPO has high ranking Herero, Nama and Damara 
leaders, however majority of the party membership and leadership are Owambo, reflective of the 
demographics in Namibia. Furthermore, SWAPO’s campaign was not solely based on genocide, and 
was based on the treatment under Apartheid. While there may have been some differences amongst 
political parties, Kaumbi highlights that the OTA had hoped that “with independence…this cause 
[restoration since the genocide] will now be advanced as a sovereign state, unfortunately that did not 
happen.”168  
 
In 1990, Namibia received independence and the democratically elected ruling party, SWAPO, adopted 
a ‘Policy of National Reconciliation’, which Godwin Kornes equates to a silent reconciliation.169 This 
meant little to no official national exploration of past injustices, which resulted in lack of avenues for 
dialogue on justice and/or consolation for these atrocities, including the genocide. White Namibians 
were permitted to keep their land and Herero land restoration claims were “merged with a broad-based 
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need for land reform…and must be asserted against a Namibian government, not a colonial state.”170 
Furthermore, these claims must be processed alongside other claims and demands for land asserted by 
other indigenous groups. In addition, requests for symbolic gestures, such as the official and national 
memorialisation that captures the narratives of genocide in Namibian history is now placed under the 
initiatives of the Namibian government. However, in terms of the responsibility to repair – morally and 
legally – the victim groups have placed this obligation under the German government, the legal 
successor of Imperial Germany, who funded and deployed a German army to exterminate the Herero 
and Nama a century ago.  
 
3. Reparative Justice and Politics of Reparations Claims   
3.1. Reparative Justice Theory Overview  
 
This section addresses the topic of reparations, its various forms and how Reparative Justice fits into 
larger debates around justice and reconciliation, with specific connections to the reparation movement 
in Namibia. An injustice is an immoral act that leads to deprivations and trauma of individuals and 
groups. Justice entails fairness and equity, and are the processes to restore equity to victims of an 
injustice, and the attempts to hold the perpetrators of the injustice accountable. Reparations is one pillar 
of justice, and is a moral and legal responsibility of the perpetrator after an injustice has occurred. It is 
a term and practice that is embedded in common and international law as an equitable principle where 
the perpetrator and beneficiary of an injustice and ill-gotten gain should make restitution, as an act of 
contrition and good will, with the aim of restoring the victim to some part of their previous lives.171 
Given the endless history of mass atrocities, international law has evolved to govern state relations, 
therefore reparations was first conceived as payments between states after international conflict.172 This 
however often involved Western state relationships with one another, and were therefore the recipients 
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of reparations after winning a war, also known as Victor’s Justice. This meant that reparations “had no 
particular moral connotation, and payments were limited by the limited nature of the preceding war.”173  
However, Sarkin argues that provisions for individual reparation have existed in international law at the 
time in the 1907 Hague Convention to civilians for unfair damages suffered during wartime.174 
Nonetheless, some scholars have argued that individual rights for reparations against a state were not 
fully recognised in international law until post-WWII, at the Paris Reparations Conference in 1945 
where stateless victims of Nazi atrocities were recognised as eligible for compensation from 
Germany.175  
 
The years following 1945 were pivotal for the evolution of universal Human Rights with the creation 
of the UN (1945), the UN Charter (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) in 
which “universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all [was 
recognised] without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion”176 Furthermore, this refers to a 
political opening for none-state actors, such as individuals, corporations and other entities, to claim 
reparations from states. More recently, policies on reparations have been outlined and adopted in the 
UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law (UN Basic Principles) in 2005 by the UN General Assembly, and the International Criminal 
Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute in 1998, obliging all member-states to respect Human Rights through the 
practice of reparations when such rights have been violated.177 While reparations is a legal obligation, 
reparations has evolved beyond state-to-state relations and has included individual rights which can be 
pursued through three main approaches: truth seeking process; criminal justice; and strategic litigation. 
As will be discussed, the OGF/NGTC are claiming reparations through strategic litigation in a class 
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action lawsuit, and the Namibian government has opted for political a state-to-state approach, however 
with the absence of Victor’s Justice and have opened political dialogue.  
 
Reparative Justice Theory falls under Restorative Justice and Corrective Justice, both approaches 
having underlying similarities. The former is an approach that prioritises the needs of the victim over 
the punishment of the perpetrator.178 This approach warrants that the perpetrator is fully aware of the 
harm they have caused, furthermore, that the perpetrator is aware of their obligation to repair damages 
through a combination, if not all of the following; restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and 
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. Therefore a meeting between victim and perpetrator 
should be facilitated in a safe space where the offenders account for their actions and victims describe 
the material, physical and psychological harm that the offender’s actions inflicted. Most importantly, 
“all parties are encouraged to decide upon a mutually agreeable form and amount of reparation – usually 
including an apology”.179 Corrective Justice on the other hand is an approach that believes that “liability 
rectifies the injustice inflicted by one person on another”.180 Theories on Corrective Justice date back 
to Aristotle, who argued that an injustice should be corrected through the restoration of what was 
unlawfully taken from a victim as a remedy to achieve equality. 181 Bernard R. Boxill (1979) has 
identified two forms of Corrective Justice: compensation and reparation. 182 Although both usually 
entail the transferal of resources to the victims, compensatory justice does not necessarily entail that it 
is the perpetrator who pays compensation, whereas reparations under Corrective Justice obligates the 
perpetrator to pay compensation and make amends.  
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Boxill stresses that reparations is greater than the transferal of resources from ‘injurer’ to victim, and is 
only completed with the acknowledgement by the injurer of his/her unlawful act.183 Without this 
acknowledgement, the perpetrator continues to insult the dignity and humanity of the victims and 
therefore the transfer of resources alone does not meet the criteria of reparations.184 A system of 
reparations is a public statement that “forces injurers to recognize, acknowledge, and honor their 
victim’s rights”185. Therefore, ideally reparations should be multifaceted and often should involve a 
logical process of acknowledgement, apology and material and symbolic transferrals that leads to the 
relative satisfaction of and relief to the victim. Needless to say, listening to the victim is vital to achieve 
this satisfaction. Not all reparation programmes are the same, as the needs of victims vary in different 
contexts and each programmes should look at what would bring justice and satisfaction to the respective 
victims.186   
3.2. Reparative Justice Practices: Material and Symbolic Reparations  
  
Reparations may come in the form of individual and collective reparations, of which this case study 
falls in line with collective, and may come in the form of either or both material and symbolic 
reparations. Material reparations refers to transferral of resources from perpetrator to the victim as a 
form of compensation for economic losses, traumatic grievances or can be the restitution of stolen 
property.187 Material reparations is not limited to monetary compensation and may include scholarships, 
development projects, infrastructure, etc. Essentially, it is a form of reparations that is targeted at the 
socio-economic upliftment of a victim group. Although material reparations can never make up for the 
losses and damages suffered, such as the loss of lives and trauma – including intergenerational trauma 
– material reparations should aim to restore the social and economic status of the victim group’s 
wellbeing. Symbolic reparations are objects, gestures and proceedings contributing to the intangible 
healing and can provide closure to the victims whilst serving to discontinue the ‘othering’ that may have 
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led to their initial victimisation.188 These may include monuments, museums, renaming public spaces, 
transforming sites of conflict into sites of memories, and commemorative events, formal apologies, 
establishing narratives of the victims, returning bodily remains, etc.189190 Brandon Hamber attaches a 
psychological importance to symbolic reparations as symbolism verifies the victims’ place in society 
and can “signal whether there is social space for their grief, anger and feelings of injustice.”191 Hamber 
highlights the benefit of reparations, which is that granting reparations may be an expression of guilt 
and good will,192 which can assist in the reconciliation between perpetrator and victim. Therefore, the 
symbolic recognition and acceptance of the responsibility by the perpetrator is necessary for the 
deliverance and acceptance of material reparations, and for its perception to be understood as ‘repairing’ 
rather than ‘opportunism’ of the victim group.  
 
Apologies as a form of reparations carries great symbolic significance if done remorsefully and can be 
central to reconciliation. Although victims often seek apologies from their perpetrators, this is not often 
the only form of reparation they seek, however it is one that should accompany the other forms.193 In 
the UN’s Basic Principles (2005), apologies is described as a form of ‘satisfaction and guarantee of 
non-repetition’. Furthermore, the UN guidelines encourage that apologies be public and should 
constitute acknowledgement and accept responsibility.194 An apology can act a symbolic turning point 
after the injustice and the “choice of words, the tone of delivery, and the time and place in which the 
apology is made all contribute to the way the apology meets or falls short of its intentions and 
expectations.”195 Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann and Mark Gibney (2004) suggest that international 
politics is transforming in the ‘Age of Apology’, where there is a universal recognition that societies 
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ought to address their past.196 Furthermore, apologies change the historical political nature of the world 
– that the powerful may act as contented and that the weak have little choice to accept – and that the 
‘Age of Apology’ is bringing the powerful to apologise to the relatively weak.197 Age of Apology’, they 
describe, has been brought in with a new politics of recognition of ‘others’.198 Formal apologies for 
historical injustices acknowledges that the previous political norm that permitted transgressions by the 
powerful on to the relatively weak was unjustifiable and in a sense, this thesis argues, surrenders or 
shifts power to the victims in theory, if accompanied by other remedies. To a large extent, a formal 
apology acknowledges, accepts and projects the narratives of the victims into the international 
community, adding greater value to the victim’s discursive opening. 
 
Examples of apologies include Germany’s apology for the Holocaust by Former Chancellor Willy 
Brandt in 1970 when he knelt in front of a Holocaust memorial, issuing a strong statement of humility; 
former US President Ronald Raegan’s apology for the internment of Japanese-American citizens during 
WWII in 1988; Apartheid government’s apology by former President F.W. De Klerk during the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1996; former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd 
to Aborigines in 2008 for racist policies including the separation of Aborigines children; and former 
UK Prime Minister David Cameron for the unjustified detention of IRA (Irish Republican Army) 
militants without trial.199 Janna Thompson highlights that some scholars such as McLaughlin (1997) 
find apologies to be meaningless and made by insincere leaders.200 Although Thompson does not equate 
all apologies to insincerity, the scholar acknowledges that some apologies are not welcomed by victims 
should the gesture be superficial. For example Aboriginal leader Patrick Dodson considers that the 
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guarantee and protection of Aboriginal Australians in the Constitution as a stronger form of apology. 
Other Aboriginal leaders claimed that an apology would be meaningless as it rather serves the purpose 
of making non-Aboriginal Australians feel less guilty.201 Therefore, formal apologies should be 
accompanied by other forms of reparations that solidifies sincerity, an issue that will be explored further 
in this case study. 
 
Thompson highlights the challenges of avoiding such scepticism of political apologies. The first relates 
to historical injustices – how can citizens and state representatives take responsibilities of their 
ancestors’ transgressions? The second is to explain how a collectivity such as a state can be remorseful. 
And the third is how to explain state commitments to avoid wrongdoing in the future.202 Therefore, what 
is required would be reflection and investigation into the injustice by the perpetrator or their 
descendants. Ruben Carranza, Cristián Correa and Elena Naughton explain that often apologies are not 
spontaneous and are usually processed in response to demands by victim groups and civil society. Upon 
request, government officials ‘take stock’ of past violations, which the authors describe as the 
investigations of the roles actors and institutions played in committing, enabling or failing to prevent 
Human Rights violations.203 This suggests that apologies are a response to civil society demands and 
are not genuine as they were not self-invoked.  However, demands by victim groups for an apology 
should be met with a response, and through formal investigations, the perpetrator or their descendants 
can come to accept their responsibility. Leonard Jamfa reiterates this sentiment; “[a]n apology can be 
considered seriously when the culprit and the victim share the same assessment of the facts.”204 
Furthermore, a formal apology may appear more sincere when other forms of reparations – material 
and symbolic – are given to the victims under respectful conduct. In the case study of the Namibian 
reparations movement, this paper will address the following forms of material and symbolic reparations 
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which will be explored in Germany’s conduct towards the Namibian actors; monetary compensation, 
formal apology, narratives and memorialisation, and return of remains.  
 
3.3. Reparations for Historical Injustice    
 
Reparations claims for historical injustices is a legal and moral contested issue in Reparative Justice, 
especially when claimants are not direct victims and perpetrators. Some scholars, such as Stephen 
Kershnar, have argued that it is unfair to make innocent descendants of a wrongdoing pay reparations 
for a crime they did not commit, and by doing so violates their rights.205 Furthermore, Kershnar 
highlights the issue around rights to reparations, arguing that simply being a member of a group that 
endured the injustice does not warrant reparations, especially if the injustice is a historical one. 
Thompson who argues for reparation claims for historical injustices, calls this the ‘Exclusion Principle’ 
– “that individuals or collectives are entitled to reparation only if they were the ones to whom the 
injustice was done”206. This same principle applies to perpetrators, that only they can be obligated to 
pay reparations. Others, like Christian Tomuschat, argue that some historical injustices have no legal 
relevance today, that current law cannot be applied retroactively, and that “lawfulness must be assessed 
against the yardstick that was applicable at the time”.207 Therefore Tomuschat is not arguing that 
reparations cannot be paid for historical injustices, but rather that one cannot use current law to assess 
legal obligations for a historical injustice prior to the creation of that law. Tomuschat argues that some 
mass killings such as the attempted exterminations of the Native Americans by European settlers, the 
Armenians in 1915 and the annihilation of a large part of the Herero tribe in 1904 deserve to be 
condemned as genocide retrospectively, but the term genocide cannot be used as a legal term to 
characterise legal obligations today.208 Sarkin (2009) and Rachel Anderson (2005), however, argue that 
treatment of the Herero and Nama populations during 1904-1908 were illegal at the time and constituted 
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an international injustice. The authors refer to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, stating that 
Germany had violated the 1899 Convention that condemned mistreatment of civilians during wartime 
and that the 1907 Hague Convention permitted individuals the right to reparations. 209 Anderson argues 
that the 1885 Berlin West Africa Convention offered protection to indigenous Africans, “not only as 
individuals but also as distinct socio-political groups.”210 In addition, the use of force labour violated 
the 1890 Anti-Slavery Conference in Brussels, and similar to the Berlin West Africa Conference, 
provided “an additional avenue for redress under the third party beneficiary doctrine.” 211 Sarkin (2014) 
situates this in a wider colonial context and argues that Africans had rights during the colonial era, and 
attempts to claim reparations for crimes in the colonial era are “based on those rights.”212 Therefore 
claims to the Herero case are contested in a legal sphere, however, as this thesis is argued, politics plays 
a role in contesting who are legally applicable to reparations.  
 
Some scholars argue for the moral necessity to address historical injustices, in which politics of 
victimisation should be considered. Michael Freeman argues that the persisting effects of historical 
injustices on cultural hierarchies and current inequities are constantly undermined. However, Freeman 
outlines this as a ‘moral amnesia’ in which forgetting or denying the past renders the theory of 
contemporary justice incomplete.213 This ‘moral amnesia’ is similar to ‘colonial amnesia’. Freeman 
further validates recognition of historical atrocities, as the injustice lies in contemporary inequalities 
and not in the historical injustice, linking present injustice to its past roots. This can be seen in the lost 
land of the Herero and Nama, which have forced their descendants on to smaller and less arable lands 
while a minority group continue to own majority of agricultural land in central post-colonial Namibia. 
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Other scholars to voice a similar rhetoric are Henry Shue and Janna Thompson. Shue argues that 
theories on justice should expand from a primary theory – of what duties are owed to victims by 
perpetrators – to include a secondary theory of what duties are owed when primary duties are not 
arranged.214 Thompson argues that when neither the victims nor their heirs receive any compensation 
for their suffering, the consequences of the unaddressed atrocity can persist after the deaths of the 
perpetrators and victims.215 Thompson further argues that to treat those suffering from the consequences 
of historical injustices as ‘equal citizens’ with those who were not harmed “is to deny an important form 
of inequality”.216 Therefore the Exclusion Principle, is a limited principle in Reparative Justice, 217 
which limits reparations claims to immediate victims of an atrocity and thereby feeds into the moral 
and colonial amnesia for some historical injustices.   
 
The Exclusion Principle ignores colonial power structures in which primary duties owed to colonial 
victims were absent, thereby necessitating secondary duties that have been passed down to descendants. 
It excludes a history of political disadvantages of oppressed ancestors that attempted to seek restoration 
for the primary atrocity in the face of decades of continuous colonisation and were denied based on 
these disadvantages, as seen in 1919 when the Herero ancestors requested for some land restoration. 
After Namibian independence in 1990, descendants of the Herero/Nama genocide have echoed a claim 
for justice that has been voiced by their ancestors throughout the last century under colonialism as the 
genocide continues to shape their socio-economic status in an independent Namibia. In an international 
political context, Sarkin points out that those in favour of reparations for crimes under colonialism are 
generally from the Global South, “including Africa, Latin America and Asia…[and] generally speaking, 
those in the Global North, in other words (but with some exceptions) people in Europe and North 
America besides African Americans do not often support such claims.”218 Not so ironically, this divide 
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is similar to those who did not support the UN Genocide Convention at first, based on their implications 
in colonial and cultural genocides, whereas new nation states from the emerging Global South, the 
former colonised, supported the ratification of Lemkin’s resolution in 1948.  
 
In relations to responsibilities of descendants of perpetrators, Julian Baggini’s article in The Guardian 
explains that Reparative Justice should not be seen as ‘punishing children for their parent’s crime,’ and 
does not require a narrative of disciplining the ‘wicked’.219 Therefore, although the German government 
is not the direct perpetrator of genocide, reparations claims against them should not be viewed as 
‘punishment’ of the ‘wicked’. Baggini highlights that it is however necessary for descendants to 
acknowledge that their wealth is partly ill-gotten and that losing some of that is a less injustice than 
giving the victim nothing. Furthermore, for those who are dismissive towards reparation claims out of 
fear of appearing guilty, need remind themselves that individual and collective responsibility are 
distinct, and acknowledging collective responsibility “requires no more than acknowledging that you 
belong to and benefit from a group that has done something wrong.”220 However, some scholars have 
argued that Germany fails to recognise their collective link to the injustice that continue to define the 
affected communities. Kössler highlights that the genocide weighs differently in Germany than in 
Namibia, as descendants of genocide are reminded of the injustice in their daily lives, i.e. the land 
distribution in central and southern Namibia that contribute towards inequalities. Germany on the other 
hand are not confronted with realities of the genocide, which the author argues is a contributing factor 
to a general post-colonial amnesia and denialism.221 For example, in 2001, the Green Bundestag Deputy 
Hans-Christian Ströbele, leader in the Bundestag committee for development cooperation, stated that 
“‘Germany has been driven out of colonialisation early on...Germany can now act in an unencumbered 
way and assume the role of avant-garde’ in Africa.’”222 Such sentiments convey a disconnect from 
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Germany’s colonial legacies that continue to impact groups, and whilst assisting in African 
development, Germany has previously refuted the historical responsibility it has to descendants of 
genocide, including accepting grievances, and making amends through acknowledgment and payments 
to the satisfaction of the victim groups. 
 
Kaumbi acknowledges that the current German government is not the perpetrator, however argues that 
the current government has “inherited the wealth of Imperial Germany.”223 Therefore, similar to the fact 
that the German government is not the perpetrator, the OTA acknowledges that Hereros and Namas are 
not the direct victims of the genocide, however they too have inherited the generational effects of the 
genocide, including the sense of injustice. Furthermore, while the Herero and Nama communities are 
aware that they are not the direct victims of the genocide, Kaumbi highlights that they have inherited 
the generational effects: the significant reduction in population; the significant losses of arable and 
cultural land; resettlements on smaller less arable ‘native reserves’; decline in economic and social 
wealth; and the inherited identity of injustice and loss of dignity. Ngavirue highlights that those most 
in need of reparations are the affected communities in southern and central Namibia, however includes 
the Damaras in this.224 Compensation from Germany in this sense is seen by the Namibian government 
and by traditional authorities as a way of healing a complex past by restoring in part some of the 
communities’ status before the genocide as a form of overdue justice.   
  
3.4. Reparations Movement under the Ovaherero Traditional Authority 
 
3.4.1. Monetary Compensation  
  
Kaumbi expresses that while one cannot put a calculative value on a human life, and although monetary 
compensation is not Namibia’s only demand, “unfortunately everything at some stage will need to be 
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quantified.”225 The OTA is one of the traditional authorities that exist within the Herero cultural group 
and do not represent all Herero chiefs. However, the OTA under Paramount Chief Riruako initiated the 
reparations movement in Namibia. The OTA separated their claims from the mass atrocities of 
colonialism and have focused on the act of genocide during 1904-1908 and have based their claims in 
the same light as claims of Holocaust survivors where Germany is making reparations to survivors and 
Israeli state.226 In 1995, approximately three hundred Herero members led by Riruako and the OTA, 
handed a petition to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl during a state visit to Namibia.227 The petition 
called for reparations in the form of acknowledgement, apology and monetary compensation of 600 
million USD from the German government. At this stage, the German and Namibian governments 
opposed this movement, the latter argued that all Namibians suffered under colonialism and one group 
cannot be singled out.228 In 2000, Prime Minister Hage Geingob229 criticised the Herero leaders for 
seeking compensation for Herero speakers only and for condemning the Namibian government for their 
inaction when all Namibians suffered in the previous decades.230 Furthermore, scholars have speculated 
that the Namibian government relied on German development aid and wanted to protect this 
relationship. The German government argued that there were no legal grounds for reparation claims. In 
fact, in 1998, former German President Roman Herzog, stated in a speech that “no international 
legislation existed at the time under which ethnic minorities could get reparations”.231 Sidney Harring 
argues that such a statement is embedded in the ‘language of colonialism’232 and that the dismissal of 
such a claim “can only be called racist”233.   
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In 2001 the Hosea Kutako Foundation, under Riruako, filed a lawsuit of 2 billion USD against three 
German companies234 for their ‘brutal alliance’ with Germany during the 1904-08 Genocide, including 
complicity in forced labour and concentration camps, and a 2 billion USD lawsuit against the German 
government, including a request for a formal apology.235 This was done through the Alien Torts Claims 
Act (ATCA), a law adopted in 1789 that grants jurisdiction to US federal courts over “any civilian 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States”. 236 The aim was to gain reparative capital that would permit Herero chiefs to repurchase land 
and distribute for Herero re-settlement, and to gain the recognition that the Herero lacked for almost a 
century. The lawsuit recited the 1899 Hague Convention, stating that Germany had violated 
international law and that the 1907 Hague Convention permitted individuals the right to reparations. 237 
Germany contested this lawsuit, claiming that the Herero were not signatory to the Hague Conventions 
at the time and therefore had no legal ground. Harring disagrees that Germany may argue that there 
existed one rule of warfare amongst Europeans, and a separate set for Europeans conducting colonial 
wars, which is “an untenable moral position”.238   
 
The US District Court of Columbia dismissed the case a few years later “for failure to state a claim”.239 
German Ambassador to Namibia Wolfgang Massing explained that lawsuits would “not lead to any 
results… [w]hile it is necessary to remember the past we should move forward together and find projects 
that will heal the wounds of the past”.240 However this solution left members in the affected groups 
unsatisfied as these projects are discussed exclusively between two governments. Furthermore, such 
projects are not reparations, as there is little satisfaction amongst members in the affected groups who 
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have argued that the Herero and Nama communities have not received their full recognition as genocide 
victims and there is little guarantee that development aid money will reach these groups. Furthermore, 
‘special relationship’ and ‘healing the wounds’ are vague terms that do not acknowledge that the Herero 
and Nama suffered exponential losses and that special amends are owed. Kaumbi, argues that there is 
no agency by the affected communities over Germany’s development aid, it is rather something they 
only hear about.241 Furthermore, there was little to no public acknowledgment of the genocide.  
  
3.4.2. Narratives and Memorialisation 
 
Kris Brown notes that what “all the forms [of symbolic reparations] have in common is an explicit aim 
to carry meaning and shape narratives.”242 Therefore, memorialisation and commemoration as a form 
of symbolic reparations validates the narrative and dignity of the victim group. Furthermore, they are 
strongly linked to discursive openings, as a stronger national and international consensus on the victims’ 
narratives strengthens the political position of the affected communities to claim reparations. Public 
memory and politics of memory in Namibia is covered by several scholars; Henning Melber (2005); 
Sarkin (2009); Heike Becker (2011); Elke Zuern (2012); Ellie Hamrick and Haley Duschinski (2017). 
For the descendants of Herero and Namas, there exists tension on two political fronts in Namibia: the 
German descendants who have valorised their narrative of the Herero War through the commemoration 
of fallen valiant soldiers; and SWAPO who have shaped and dominated national memory around 
liberation narratives, in which the Herero and Nama rebellions are not reflected in national 
commemoration. Melber touches on these themes of commemorative narratives, in which the 
‘selectivity’ of narratives commemorated in Namibian public memory tend to downplay the genocide 
in national liberation history.243 Similarly, Zuern highlights the role of liberation narratives in public 
memory, in which SWAPO’s narrative has taken a central position in national commemoration and 
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memorialisation. Zuern defines memorials as “sites of personal, cultural and political remembrance, 
offering stylised presentations of the past, highlighting and glorifying certain actors while purposefully 
forgetting others.”244 Zuern argues that certain memories in Namibia, such as the genocide, have been 
almost forgotten in national public memory, and has added to the feelings of injustice of the 
descendants. Becker demonstrates this further, highlighting that the Heroes’ Acre in Namibia is the 
“centre stage of the annual political rituals”245 which commemorate Namibian heroes and heroines, 
however this is limited to SWAPO soldiers.246 Similarly, Hamrick and Duschinski argue that 
“Namibia’s monuments, memorials and museums suppress the genocide from national memory.”247  
 
German descendants’ role in public memory has been an affront on the public memory on genocide, 
commemorating a colonial history in several ways, which opposes a discursive opening for the Herero. 
Including the abolition of the Blue Book, there have been instances when German speaking Namibians 
have diluted the atrocities of genocide with narratives of war between the German settlers and the 
Herero population.  In 1964, German descendants commemorated fallen German soldiers during the 
Herero War.248 This narrative validates the Kaiser’s war in which heroic German soldiers lost their lives 
defending German settlers. Herero leaders publicly argued that this commemorated genocide and the 
killings of women and children. Kutako, who had personally endured the hardships and losses of the 
Ohamakari battle, the Omaheke desert and concentration camp,249 argued that it would remind them of 
an unjust past. Kapuuo argued that German descendants were commemorating genocide and stated that 
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“there is little difference between the extermination order of General von Trotha and the extermination 
of Jews by Adolf Hitler.”250  
 
In post-colonial Namibia, overlooking the CBD in Windhoek remains the Alte Feste, a fort built by the 
German Colonial Administration, which serves as Namibia’s National Museum.251 The plaque placed 
on this fortress reads: “The Alte Feste was built in 1890…as a stronghold to preserve peace and order 
between the rivalling Namas and Hereros.”252 Although conflict between the two groups existed, Zuern 
argues that this narrative condones German colonialism and portrays their dominance as ‘selfless’. This 
fits into the narrative that colonialism was for the greater good of Africans. Carrying a similar narrative, 
the Reiterdenkmal a grandiose statue, erected in 2012 on the Kaiser’s birthday, stood to the left of the 
Alte Feste, a war memorial “celebrating the might of German Empire.”253 Across the road from this 
statue, the Christuskirche church was built to commemorate the defeat of the Herero and Nama, housing 
bronze plaques in the interior listing the names of German soldiers who died.254 Similarly, the Marine 
Denkmal statue was erected in 1908 in Swakopmund, and depicts two German soldiers – one standing 
with a rifle, the other lying dead on the rock. 255 
 
Zuern captures the agency of descendants of genocide that have confronted this imbalanced public 
memory.256 The Reiterdenkmal statue was removed in 2009 and replaced with the Independence 
Memorial Museum, which includes the Herero/Nama Genocide in its displays on liberation, standing 
between the church and the fort. This was strategic in order to shift the dominance of the German 
colonial narrative and to shift the narrative towards the liberation against the oppression of foreign rule. 
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More recently in 2017, activists in Namibia splashed red paint on the Marine Denkmal in 
Swakopmund.257 ‘Operation Back to Germany’ is an activist group initiated by Namibians that began 
lobbying in 2015 to have the Marine Denkmal removed from its central spot in Swakopmund and 
returned to Germany. In an interview conducted by New Era journalist, activists explained that the 
statue and its central position “mocks the pain and suffering Namibians had to undergo during German 
genocide and this humiliation cannot be allowed to continue after 25 years [after independence].”258 
Kössler (2015) explores denialism in Namibia, particularly in Namibia’s only German newspaper, 
Allgemeine Zeitung, in which many printed public letters from the German community within Namibia 
refute the idea that the war involved genocide.259 More recently, (2018) public debates have re-surfaced 
in various Namibian newspapers in which anonymous German descendants have reiterated a similar 
rhetoric. The participant claimed that the “current tribal chief of the Herero and his underlings are trying 
to enrich themselves on the back of their ancestors, nothing more nothing less.”260 While not every 
German speaking Namibian internalise such narratives of the past, there is a spectrum of narratives, in 
which the two ends contradict one another. Furthermore, such rhetoric reduces the nature of reparations 
to monetary gain, which does not paint an accurate picture of a century long plight for restoration of 
dignity and economic status that continues to shape the aspirations of the Herero community leaders.   
 
Katjavivi argues that the inclusion of German speaking Namibians in national dialogue around the 
question and acceptance of genocide would be beneficial to national reconciliation, by “bringing various 
Namibian communities to appreciate the fact that events of the past should not continue to haunt us.”261 
Katjavivi argues that such conversations can be prompted by a stronger national commemoration and 
memorialisation of the genocide, including its inclusion in education curriculums and in the cultural 
sector. For example, Namibian artist, Isabel Katjavivi’s art exhibition, titled They Tried to Bury Us 
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(2018), in the National Art Gallery of Namibia captured the tension of neglecting an important narrative 
of Namibian history.262 Displaying fragile clay heads and body parts on the floor, the artist covered 
these pieces with sand, stones and grass collected from scenes in Namibia that are strongly connected 
to the Genocide (Omaheke Desert, Ohamakari, etc.). The audience walked “the thin line between the 
past and the present,”263 with the past staring up at them. This interaction represented the need for 
Namibia to unearth its history – its narrative – in order to heal the wounds of the past and reconcile.  
 
While the government have made become more inclusive towards other narratives of liberation, i.e. the 
Independence Museum, Kaumbi argues that “there is no political will to elevate this thing of genocide 
and to memorialise it to the extent that you want it.”264 Rightfully, Kaumbi insists that the genocide “is 
of national importance. Even before Cassinga265…there was this [genocide] within the boundary state 
known as Namibia. It was the first genocide of the 20th century. Before even the Holocaust. Before the 
Armenian Genocide. We had a genocide inside here. That should take a place of honour and respect.”266 
The government is yet to create a national memory, a motion that is pending in the Namibian parliament 
since 2016. SWANU’s president, Usutuaije Maamberua, introduced a motion in 2016 for a Genocide 
Remembrance Day, 267  which received positive responses from ruling and opposition parties, however 
has not been formalised. While there are several visible reminders of the liberation struggle in which 
SWAPO rose to power, state initiated memorials of the genocide still need to become a reality. Further 
insensitivities towards memorialisation include the commercial construction on the sites of genocide 
mass graves in Swakopmund, as well as a camp site on Shark Island, which was a concentration camp 
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in which many Namas and other Namibians perished.268 There have however been some citizen-initiated 
memorials to break away from this dominant narrative and “provide a more inclusive narrative of local 
histories,”269 such as the Ovaherero/Ovambanderu Memorial in the Swakopmund Memorial Park.   
 
Zuern acknowledges that the German government’s role has been helpful towards memorialisation in 
some respects, such as its funding towards Namibian activist-initiated projects, i.e. the Okakarara 
Community Cultural and Tourism Centre and part of the Swakopmund Memorial Park. Furthermore, 
the German government has sent representatives to commemorations and other events held at these 
sites. However, Zuern argues that the “German government has sought to present itself as addressing 
the past, without acknowledging genocide or offering reparations.”270 This not only includes monetary 
compensation, but a formal apology. Germany’s propensity to determine what duties are owed by them 
influenced its reluctant attitude towards these forms of reparations.  
 
3.4.3. Apology 
 
The OTA have been demanding a formal apology from Germany since 1995 in Riruako’s petition. 
When former German President Herzog visited Namibia in 1998, the President argued that too much 
time had passed since the incident for a formal apology to make sense.271 However, Herzog assured 
Herero leaders and other Namibians that Germany would live up to its historical responsibility through 
development aid projects in Namibia.272 President Herzog had failed to make a connection to the crimes 
of German ancestors which obligate a responsibility to repair, and assuming that development aid is a 
suffice consolation to descendants of genocide. An apology was given in 2004 by German Minister for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul offered an apology in 2004, at 
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a ceremony that commemorated the hundredth year anniversary of the beginning of the genocide.273`In 
Wieczorek-Zeul’s plea for forgiveness, she acknowledged:  
“A century ago, the oppressors – blinded by colonialist fervour – became agents of violence, discrimination, 
racism and annihilation in Germany’s name. The atrocities committed at that time would be termed genocide – 
and nowadays a General von Trotha would be prosecuted and convicted. We Germans accept our historical and 
moral responsibility …in the words of the Lord’s Prayer that we share, I ask you to forgive us our trespasses.”274 
 
This apology was accepted by Minister of Lands, Hifikepunye Pohamba275 and Riruako. Prime Minister, 
the late Theo-Ben Gurirab, called on Namibians to accept the apology, however explained that the 
apology did not answer enough questions. Given that there have been renewed requests for a political 
apology by Namibian government and communities, this has been disregarded as a formal apology. 
One can argue whether the apology in 2004 constituted a state apology although some scholars have 
accepted it as such.276  Hinz however, refers to the German Parliament Resolution of June 2004 that 
made no mention of the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘apology’ and states that the German minister stepped 
“beyond the limits set by the German Foreign Minister”.277 Hinz refers to Wieczorek-Zeul’s 
autobiography where the minister had feared that she may be dismissed upon arrival in Germany,278 
revealing that the apology was not state approved. Although the minister was applauded by many upon 
her arrival and she was not dismissed, her doubts reveal that her apology was a reflection of her personal 
commitment to reconciliation and not necessarily the state’s. Leonard Jamfa has questioned the sincerity 
behind this gesture and speculates that this apology was in response to two factors. The first factor is 
the events in Zimbabwe that began in 2000, which was the seizure of land from white farmers after 
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slow land reforms and the withdrawal of British financing.279 Jamfa suggests that members in Germany 
feared the same would happen in Namibia and acknowledged the responsibility they had to Namibians 
of German descent. The second factor, and the most probable cause for the apology, was the Court Case 
that Riruako’s Hosea Kutako Foundation filed against Germany in 2001.280  
 
Within this same speech, the German minister re-iterated Germany’s commitment to development aid: 
“Accepting our special historical responsibility towards Namibia, we wish to continue our close 
partnership at all levels…looking towards the future and wishes to help Namibia tackle the challenges 
of development.” 281Therefore, this apology was given without the acknowledgement or acceptance of 
state responsibility to pay reparations for genocide, which carries more symbolic weight than 
development aid to the Namibian government for all Namibians. Furthermore, Jamfa highlights that the 
German minister’s phrase ‘atrocities committed at that time would be termed genocide nowadays’ 
served as a subtle reminder that there is no legal obligation today. Moreover, she asks for forgiveness 
in the name of God, and not in the name of the German state, which further reduced Germany’s legal 
responsibility in 2004 to pay reparations.282 Kaumbi highlights the essential crux of reparations, 
“Sometimes you can repair an injustice through your conduct. If your conduct is conciliatory, you have 
proper remorse and respect, people will start to look at it differently. But if you want to play hard ball 
then obviously people will …say it’s all about the money.”283 
 
As Thompson argued, a political apology is central to Reparative Justice as an injustice to a group 
becomes part of their historical identity.284 An apology in this context would assist in the restoration of 
dignity to these identities. Boxill similarly regards a formal apology as essential to reparations and not 
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separate to Reparative Justice.285 Thompson argues that a state’s remorse may be impossible as not all 
citizens may come to acknowledge the events as genocide or feel responsible as descendant. However 
dialogue on the matter is a necessary step to allowing the narrative of genocide and historical injustice 
that continue to impact descendants to disseminate into Namibian and German communities. Therefore, 
the exploration and state acceptance of the victims’ narrative is essential for the formation of a collective 
identity around responsibility to repair. What comes to mind is the mandatory education curriculums in 
Germany around the Holocaust and its purpose to condemn the genocide of WWII, whilst Germany 
pays reparations to its survivors, Jewish organisations and the State of Israel. The state apology for the 
Holocaust further reaffirms the victim narrative of Jewish Holocaust survivors. While there may be 
German citizens that deny that the Holocaust took place, the state is taking necessary steps to circulate 
narratives in which the German state is responsible for the human rights violations committed against 
the Jewish community in Europe during WWII.  
 
3.4.4. Return of Remains 
 
Another form of symbolic reparations is the return of bodily remains, which has taken place at an 
international level with the return of skulls from Germany. In order for the process to carry symbolic 
weight, the return should be done in a sensitive conduct. During the genocide many hundreds of Herero, 
Nama, and Damara and San skulls were transported to scientists in Germany for scientific research.286 
This has been one of the many sore aspects of the genocide; the repatriation, remembrance and burial 
of ancestors’ skulls. Although the practicality of tracking and identifying skulls and human remains 
may be a massive task, Kössler notes these issues carry “deep symbolic implications, both on the level 
of an individual’s descendent and on that of communities seeking closure.”287 After the Herero and 
Nama traditional leaders appealed to the Namibian government, an official request for the repatriation 
of bodily remains was forwarded to the German government in 2008.288 In 2011, twenty skulls had been 
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returned, followed by another forty in 2014, and more recently nineteen skulls and other bones were 
handed over in August 2018. While under 100 skulls have been returned, thousands of skulls remain 
unaccounted for.   
 
In 2011, a delegation of seventy people, comprised of members from government, activist organisations 
including the OGF (and Riruako) and NGTC, received the remains of victims of genocide in what has 
been described as an unceremonious event in Berlin. This was due to the absence of some invited VIP 
German officials. Furthermore, the German Foreign Minister’s speech avoided the term ‘genocide’.289 
Within the same speech, the minister pled for reconciliation in the absence of a state apology, reiterated 
Germany’s cooperation in development aid, and mentioned the high percentage of German tourists that 
visit Namibia.290 The message one can derive from such a speech is that reconciliation ought to happen 
on Germany’s terms whilst reducing the extent of the atrocity with the removal of the term ‘genocide’. 
Kössler observes that the repatriation of 2011 did not bring closure to the affected communities and its 
modalities “opened a new chapter of painful and conflict-ridden proceedings”.291  Furthermore, 
members of the OGF and NGTC who had brought documents to Berlin in 2011 calling for reparations, 
were accused by the German Ambassador to Namibia for having made a bad impression and going with 
a hidden agenda.292 This insinuates that the return of skulls and requests for monetary compensation 
should be held separately, whilst both form part of reparations. The 2014 repatriation received less 
publicity as no representatives from the affected communities were part of the delegation, except the 
deputy chairman of the Council of Traditional Leaders in the government structures.  
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4. 2015 Politics of Reparations: Germany Acknowledges Genocide  
 
4.1. 2006 Motion on Genocide: One Common Ground and Two Trajectories  
 
The OTA’s political opening that supports their reparations claims had no substantial state support 
before 2006. The Motion on the Ovaherero Genocide (Motion) introduced by Riruako to the Namibian 
parliament in September 2006, which was unanimously passed, can be seen as one aspect that all interest 
parties agreed on, however has led to several disagreements. The Motion is pivotal in the reparations 
movement as it called for the Namibian government to assist with the Herero/Nama reparations claims 
after the 2001 class action lawsuit brought no results. The main points that were highlighted in the 
Motion were that Germany acknowledge their crimes against the Ovaherero that constitute genocide – 
including similar treatment towards the Namas and the Damaras; to offer an apology, and to enter a 
dialogue with representatives of the affected communities and the Namibian government in order to 
negotiate reparations.293 This motion received the overwhelming support from the National Assembly 
in October 2006 and the implementation was taken to the Executive Arm of government.294 Woolford 
and Wolejszo highlight that the involvement of a state in a reparation movement cannot be undermined 
when understanding the political opening for a victim group, as seen with Israel in the Claims 
Conference (1951).295 However this motion has led to two different trajectories; state to state dialogue 
under the two governments and a class action lawsuit by the OGF and NGTC. Both these approaches 
are based on the respective actor’s position of power in relation to Germany. The Motion and its key 
points have become the foundation for the mandate of the Namibian Special Envoy on Genocide and 
the OGF/NGTC’s court case in New York, which emphasises acknowledgment, apology and 
compensation payments.296  
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Almost a decade after the 2006 Motion was adopted, the Namibian and German governments officiated 
dialogue on Genocide in 2015 through the appointments of the Namibian Special Envoy, Dr Zedekia 
Ngavirue297, and the German Special Envoy, Ruprecht Polenz.298 Both Special Envoys represent the 
views and positions of their respective governments. Current speaker of the National Assembly 
Professor Peter Katjavivi stresses that linked to these negotiations is the need for Germany to admit to 
genocide, return bodily remains of victims, to offer a formal apology and for the Namibian government 
to look towards stronger memorialisation.299 Katjavivi, noted that this approach may bring about a ‘win-
win’ outcome as “it is in the interest of Germany to come clean to one of those issues that have been 
haunting them throughout history.”300 Ngavirue recaps that the aim of ongoing negotiations is to clear 
this issue around reparations “with the view of getting proper reconciliation between the two 
countries.”301 Furthermore, the Special Envoy cautions that monetary compensation is not exclusive to 
the Herero and Nama as other communities such as the San and Damara inherited significant losses. 
Therefore affected areas will be targeted for reparations development programmes, specifically 
southern and central Namibia.302 
 
When the Motion was passed, the implementation was passed to the Executive, who appointed a special 
cabinet committee to oversee this process of negotiation.303 This committee established a technical 
committee to carry out the research and work out the documentation that would form the basis of the 
Special Envoy’s mandate. There are opportunities for representation of Herero and Nama traditional 
authorities at two levels: the Technical Committee and the Chief’s Forum. Some chiefs of the affected 
communities have sent representatives to the Technical Committee in order to feed in information and 
requests, and to report back to the respective chiefs. It was later considered that a more appropriate and 
effective mechanism for the chiefs to get direct communications and to be part of decisions, the special 
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cabinet committee established the Chief’s Forum, chaired by the Vice President.304 Whilst chiefs and 
interest parties such as the OGF and NGTC are encouraged to participate in such structures, some 
members of the affected communities are displeased with the leading role the government has taken, 
reducing them to supportive roles, while others view this as an opportunity to pursue negotiations. 
Therefore, considering that there is no unified voice within the Herero group, the involvement of the 
state has either positively or negatively affected the political opening of the reparations movement.  
 
Hamrick and Duschinski break down the politics of the Herero groups in terms of political traditional 
authority affiliation, political affiliation, genocide committee/organisations support, historical narrative, 
and legal imagination.305 Under different affiliations and expectations, the authors have identified two 
groups: the Riruako and Maherero group. Although both groups’ narratives acknowledge the genocide 
of 1904 and the need for justice, the Maherero group view the genocide as connected to the Apartheid 
liberation struggle and that the Herero are part of the ‘one Namibia, one Nation’ and have to cooperate 
within this context. The Maherero group do not recognise Rukoro as Paramount Chief306 and support 
the various Herero sub-chiefs of the Royal House.307 Furthermore, this group is generally politically 
affiliated with SWAPO, who in turn recognises their traditional authorities. In addition, the Maherero 
group’s genocide committee affiliation lies with the Ovaherero/Ovambanderu Council for the Dialogue 
(OCD-04). This has since included some Nama chiefs, which now make up the ONCD-04 
(Ovaherero/Ovambanderu and Nama Council for Dialogue).308 The Riruako group supported Kuaima 
Riruako’s claim to Paramount Chieftaincy before his death in 2014, and his successor, Vekuii Rukoro. 
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Politically, the Riruako group support opposition parties to SWAPO, including NUDO. Hamrick and 
Duschinski suggest that since Riruako was the leader of the opposition party NUDO, the SWAPO-led 
government refused to recognise him as the Herero Paramount Chief.309 In addition, the Riruako group 
maintain that the OGF, who report to the current Rukoro traditional authority (OTA), are the champions 
of the reparation movement. Furthermore the OGF and the NGTC work closely together.  
 
Phanuel Kaapama, who is a supporter of the Maherero group and present in the Special Envoy 
negotiations, explains that the government represents a much bigger constituency of groups that were 
not affected by genocide. This places the government “in a very difficult situation for having to balance 
the needs of all the different communities, others that may be sitting without basic human needs but 
were not affected by genocide.”310 Therefore Kaapama highlights that it is important for the affected 
communities to work within the current political context of Namibia, while it is also important for the 
government to recognise “the special relationship, the special impact, the extraordinary impact that the 
genocide…committed by Germany has on their community.”311 Kaapama concludes that the 
government’s position is not ‘straight forward’. Furthermore, Kaapama cautions that the OGF and 
NGTC “do not represent all members of the affected communities of the genocide.”312 The nuances in 
politics within the Herero group highlight that reparation movements do not have a unified voice. With 
regards to the government structures, Kaapama views that “to some, the glass was half empty and they 
rejected it outright…to others, it was half full and they opted to negotiate with dialogue.”313  
 
Part of those who view the Special Envoy structures as the ‘glass half-full’ are the Maherero group, 
specifically Herero and Nama chiefs in the ONCD-04. Members of the ONCD-04 were reported in The 
Namibian (March 2017) to have claimed in March 2017 to be the true representatives of the affected 
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communities.314 The ONCD-04 have joined negotiations as an interest party and through dialogues, 
have made proposals and amendments to the governments’ proposed structures, i.e. the Chief’s 
Forum.315 The ONCD-04 are represented in the Technical Committee and the Chiefs Forum, and 
Ngavirue explained that “those people who are representing the chiefs that are participating, sit with me 
in the negotiations and they make suggestions.”316 In addition to the traditional representatives who 
have been elected by their respective communities, Kaapama highlights that other members of the 
communities such as himself and Ngavirue, who are both Herero, have not necessarily been selected by 
their communities, rather by the government based on their expertise.317 Therefore, there is a 
combination of representatives and government-selected experts from Herero and Nama communities 
present in the government structures who have a direct invested interest and contribution to the 
negotiations with Germany. However, Katjavivi – also a member of the affected community – explains 
and conquers with the government’s position; “that first the negotiations are between the two 
governments…[however] the government of Namibia is conscious of the fact that various stakeholders 
must form part of the team that is involved in shaping the activities relating to negotiations.”318 Ngavirue 
explains that the negotiations are “state-to-state, but with the community speaking…being adequately 
represented, and participating, but with a single spokesperson.”319 However Ngavirue specifies that in 
a state-to-state dialogue, interest parties are ‘not equal’ to the Special Envoy.320 
 
Those who view the glass half-empty, are the Riruako group and Nama traditional authorities under the 
late David Frederick, who rejected to join the Special Envoy’s team unless they are given autonomy 
from and within the government structures. Although the Motion called for the Namibian government 
to act as an interest party, Kaumbi argues that the government is acting as “the party”.321 The OTA 
                                                          
314 Ndapewoshali Shapwanale, ‘Namibia: Groups Split Over Genocide Claims,’ The Namibian, March 2, 2017, 
https://allafrica.com/stories/201703020832.html  
315 Interview with Professor Phanuel Kaapama, September 3, 2018. 
316 Ibid.  
317 Ibid.  
318 Interview with Professor Peter Katjavivi, September 5, 2018.  
319 Interview with Dr Zedekia Ngavirue, September 5, 2018. 
320 Interview with Dr Zedekia Ngavirue, September 5, 2018. 
321 Interview with Uazuva Kaumbi, September 4, 2018.  
67 
 
under Rukoro and their allied Nama chiefs, and the OGF and NGTC, have argued for a ‘tri-partied’ 
dialogue or ‘trialogue’ among the German government, the Namibian government and elected 
representatives from the affected to communities, all present as equal parties.322 Kaumbi explains that 
the government structures need further changes through negotiations with Namibian interest parties so 
that either there are two heads of negotiations, or suggests the compromise of a deputy to Special Envoy 
Ngavirue who has been elected by people of the affected communities.323 There are no national statistics 
that suggest support base figures for each group. Ngavirue speculates that in terms of Herero and Nama 
chiefs, there are more chiefs present in government structures, however admits that he cannot deny the 
large crowds that Rukoro draws.324  
 
Given that the government has insisted that their structures remain as they are, those who have rejected 
such structures have opted to pursue reparations through strategic litigation in the New York District 
Court, where they hope to either sue the German government for reparations or reach an agreement 
where they are included in the state-to-state negotiations with greater autonomy. The ongoing court 
case was launched in January 2017, after the appointments of the Special Envoys and is somewhat 
similar to the case of 2001, however there are several differences. The first is that it is not led under the 
Hosea Kutako Foundation, however by its successor OGF, and the NGTC. Secondly, the Namas have 
since been included in a joint legal pursuit for reparations given the similar treatment during the 
genocide. This shared history was acknowledged in 2007, in a joint position paper, undersigned by the 
Nama and Herero Traditional Leaders (the late Fredericks and the late Riruako), where the 
Extermination Orders for the Herero (2 October 1904) and for the Nama (22 April 1905) are recalled.325 
Lastly, in addition to the ATCA, the ongoing court case is making use of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which advocates for the right of indigenous peoples to represent 
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themselves internationally. The aim of the joint pursuit in reparations is highlighted by Kaumbi, who 
explains that there is a “certain logical process…the first one is for Germany to admit that it committed 
genocide and not try and sugar coat it with words like atrocities…then the next step is obviously an 
apology…the next thing is reparations”.326 These are key elements in the OGF and NGTC position on 
reparations; financial compensation, repatriation of bodily remains and cultural artefacts, consulted 
development projects in areas of the affected communities, apologies and other forms of symbolic 
acknowledgements, including monuments, memorials and museums.327 Furthermore the OGF and 
NGTC have noted that efficient land reform that acknowledge precolonial land claims would be ideal328 
as some ancestral land is owned by white farmers.329  
 
While there is a divided opinion on representation, the Namibian government has expressed that the 
doors will remain open to all interest parties, whom they continue to encourage to join under the Special 
Envoy.330 Katjavivi chooses not to share a judgement on the New York court case, however states that 
“some people [unknown] say maybe it is not a bad thing to energise the German government to see the 
urgency of the matter.”331 Kaumbi explains that there is no hatred between the Namibian government 
and OGF/NGTC and their respective traditional leaders. Furthermore, Kaumbi acknowledges that it is 
the democratic right of all Namibians to talk about genocide in whichever forum suits them. Lastly, 
Kaumbi acknowledges that whichever pursuit succeeds, all Herero and Namas would benefit in that 
victory of justice:   
“But we know that should they [Namibian government] succeed for instance, we 
would also benefit, because they won’t say ‘no, you are not ONCD-04’... On the 
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other hand also, if we succeed in our court case, they will also benefit because 
remember it is a class action. So it’s not about Rukoro. It is a class action for all 
the people who qualify or meet the class criteria…every Herero, whether they 
supported us or even if they were our biggest opponent, will also benefit.” 332 
 
Therefore, although there is no clear consensus on Namibian unity and representation, there are some 
common goals, such as the requests for acknowledgment, apology, and reparations – both symbolic and 
material – and that the affected areas, central and southern Namibia, be targeted for reparations. 
Furthermore the acknowledgement that the Namibian government improve memorialisation is accepted 
by members in government and the civil society organisations. More importantly, there is a consensus 
that despite the schisms and fragmentation in pursuits, there is a common vision of results – that central 
and southern areas in Namibia are targeted for reparations. Germany has responded to both approaches 
differently: the appointment of a German Special Envoy to negotiate with Ngavirue; and the refusal to 
be summoned to the New York District Court by claiming state immunity.  
  
4.2. 2015: Germany’s New Position 
 
As demonstrated in chapter three, the German government’s responses before 2015 has been to 
superficially acknowledge its ‘special’ relationship with Namibia through annual payments of 
development aid, to refute the legal grounds of reparation claims and avoid contact with the OTA and 
reparations organisations. Even as the German government began recognising the need to acknowledge 
its shared past with Namibia, the acknowledgment of ‘genocide’ was absent. Whilst the German 
government has funded some projects, such as the memorial sites in Okakarara and Swakopmund, they 
have not termed these as ‘reparations’, however as means of ‘addressing the past.’333 Similarly, while 
Germany pays development aid, scholars such as Sarkin and Kössler, some of the Herero and Nama 
chiefs, and more recently the Namibian government, have not accepted these as Reparative Justice. This 
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approach to ‘heal the wounds’ of the past are Germany’s terms of reconciliation, not the victim’s terms. 
This is arguably due to the position of international power of Germany, to set the terms of reconciliation 
whilst appearing as the ‘rescuer’ through development aid. Furthermore, by avoiding terms such as 
‘genocide’, ‘reparations’ and ‘justice’, Germany’s foreign policy towards the affected communities 
have continued to add insult to injury in order to evade state responsibility.  
 
Therefore 2015 is pivotal in the development of the reparations movement. German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel publicly admitted in an international broadcasted speech that what happened to the Herero 
constituted a genocide.334 This was translated into official policy the following year.335 This statement 
was overdue, considering that the UN classified the Herero massacre as genocide in the 1985 Whitaker 
Report.336 Nonetheless, this official acknowledgement in 2015 was a necessary step in order to solidify 
a dialogue within Germany, and between Namibia and Germany in which a state apology is part of the 
agenda. Since 2015 one may argue that the German government has changed its position on how to 
address the past and pursuing a more genuine reconciliation with Namibia through the appointment of 
Ruprecht Polenz as the Special Envoy on the German-Namibia Relationship, and has accepted the need 
for additional payments and a formal apology once the negotiations are concluded. However, this was 
done after decades of political obstacles that descendants of genocide have faced in order to receive 
such an acknowledgement. Furthermore, the appointment of Polenz and Ngavirue is monumental in the 
sense that the two individuals are meant to act as equal counterparts in what the German Foreign 
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier described in 2015 as a ‘confidential dialogue’.337 This chapter will 
explore Germany’s new reluctant approach under the Special Envoy, and consider whether this is a 
break from the German government’s previous policies, and whether there are small traces of denialism 
in their conduct. 
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4.2.1. Special Envoys: Negotiating a Common Position on the Past  
 
Events in 2015 can be seen to an extent as a break from prior ‘denialism’/‘amnesia, and has solidified 
the acceptance of the narrative of genocide by the German state, a symbolic gesture which has been 
overdue, considering that the UN had officially acknowledged the Herero Genocide in 1985. In an 
interview conducted by Isaac Mugabi with Polenz, the German Special Envoy stated that through this 
dialogue between the Special Envoys, the two countries need to find a common understanding of what 
happened in the past, which he admits is not an easy topic. Furthermore, Polenz states that Germany is 
serious about finding this common understanding by listening to the requests of the Namibian side, the 
Herero side and the Nama side. This can presumably be requests by Herero and Nama chiefs in the 
ONCD-04 through Ngavirue as the OTA, OGF and the NGTC are not present in negotiations. 
Nonetheless, Polenz’s mandate concerns his counterparts – the Namibian Special Envoy and his team 
– and notes that a common understanding is necessary for a ‘reliable positive relationship’ between the 
two governments. The difficulty, Polenz highlights, arises out of the need for the two governments to 
find a “common diplomatic language, a common understanding and conclusions for the future.”338   
 
However, there seems to lack of a common diplomatic language during negotiations between the 
Special Envoys and their teams. Special Envoy Ngavirue and Kaapama, who are present during 
negotiations, offer great insight into the issues around language between the two counterparts that does 
not seem very ‘common’. Ngavirue notes that “from the word go, the Germans have been very sensitive 
to the use of the term ‘reparations’”.339 Ngavirue suggests that the word ‘reparations’ is a sensitive word 
to Germany as they have a delicate history with the term following WWI and WWII. Furthermore, 
Ngavirue suggests that Germany tends “to think it will open up a Pandora’s Box to other countries that 
are now also wanting some form of compensation and using reparations.”340 From Kaapama’s 
experience at the negotiating table, the politics professor notes that first Germany was reluctant to pay 
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reparations because they “at first rejected the term ‘reparations’. Later on when they came and said yes 
we can do it, but…without that term.” This he suggests may be due to the OGF/NGTC’s lawsuit in New 
York against the German government, which has placed them in a nervous position. When asked which 
term the Namibian negotiating team uses, Ngavirue stated that he and his team “have stuck to the terms 
of reference resulting from our motion…so we use ‘reparations’ and they talk of ‘healing wounds’”.341  
Therefore, while there seems to be a break from ‘denialism’, there seems to be a continuation of vague 
language from the German negotiating team that evades the term ‘reparations’ due to the international 
implications of former colonial subjects demanding justice in the forms of reparations from former 
colonisers and to dissuade legal obligations in the New York District Court. 
 
While an amount of ‘reparations’/‘healing wounds’ is an issue in negotiations – Germany rejected 
Ngavirue’s proposed amount of N$1.3 trillion in early 2018342 – one successful outcome from 
negotiations is that development aid will remain separate from the negotiated amount.343 Therefore, 
there is arguably a break from Germany’s previous language that placed development aid as their 
‘remedy’ to address a blanketed past. However, Ngavirue and Kaapama suggest that Germany’s attitude 
towards this notion was not easily compliant. Ngavirue notes that in the early stages of the negotiations, 
there were those in the German government who felt that the Namibian team should take the 
development aid Germany has been paying into consideration when negotiating an amount. Kaapama 
states that “in the process of negotiations, you always hear every now and then the German Special 
Envoy or a member of the German negotiating team referring to the development aid they are already 
giving to Namibia…I know that Germany has been implicitly trying to use development aid…to subdue 
the Namibian demands for reparations.”344 Furthermore, the Namibian team “took notice of how the 
German Envoy and negotiating team were trying to do power posturing,” however the Namibian 
                                                          
341 Interview with Dr Zedekia Ngavirue, September 5, 2018. 
342 The Patriot Reporter, ‘Genocide negotiations fundamentally flawed: Rukoro,’ The Patriot, March 23, 2018. 
https://thepatriot.com.na/index.php/2018/03/23/genocide-negotiations-fundamentally-flawed-rukoro/ 
343 Interview with Dr Zedekia Ngavirue, September 5, 2018. 
344 Interview with Professor Phanuel Kaapama, September 3, 2018.  
73 
 
negotiating team ‘stood their ground’ in order to keep development aid and reparations separate.345 
Relating back to a history of German officials publicly referring to development aid in place of 
reparations, development aid continues to be Germany’s weapon and outlook on the matter.  Therefore, 
a common language in which ‘development aid’ does not feature as ‘reparations’ needs to be established 
between the two negotiating teams.  
 
Therefore, there is a continuity of Germany’s ‘power posturing’ which attempts to subdue the Namibian 
Special Envoy’s team during the negotiations, considering that ‘reparations’ continues to be missing 
from the Special Envoy Polenz’s ‘common diplomatic language’ and replaced by ‘healing wounds’, 
and the reoccurring references to development aid. This refers back to Kössler (2015) who argues that 
the ‘special’ relationship between the two governments, in which genocide and consequences are 
debated, is asymmetrical.346 Although the Namibian government – and organisations such as the OGF 
and NGTC – has stood its ground and has pushed for Germany to officially acknowledge genocide, 
return bodily remains, and agree to an apology, Germany’s approach continuously tries to take 
advantage of its position of power in a post-colonial context to subdue requests or superficially address 
their duties owed as ‘healing wounds’. Lastly, this lack of common position can be noted in the two 
Special Envoys publicly referred titles. Ngavirue is often referred to as the Special Envoy on Genocide 
in Namibian news outlets, whereas Polenz is referred to as the Special Envoy on Dialogue or Namibian 
Relations in German news outlets.  
 
Rukoro reported in March 2018, arguing that the appointment of Polenz is ‘fundamentally flawed’ and 
that the negotiating sides on the genocide are not equal as “the Namibian envoy is mandated by 
parliament and subsequently appointed by the President…the German Envoy is appointed by the 
Federal Minister and is at the level of an African desk in the foreign ministry and reports to the head of 
                                                          
345 Interview with Professor Phanuel Kaapama, September 3, 2018. 
346 Kössler, Namibia and Germany: Negotiating the Past, 1.  
74 
 
the African department”.347 Therefore, to Rukoro, the importance of the genocide reparations talks exist 
at different levels in the respective governments, and therefore carry different weights of significance. 
Furthermore, Rukoro explains that the Special Envoy Ngavirue is the result of a unanimous vote in 
parliament, and therefore his mandate is derived from the main points highlighted in the 2006 Motion. 
According to Rukoro, the German parliament on the other hand has yet to pass a resolution that affirms 
the Special Envoy’s mandate, and therefore questions what Polenz’s mandate is derived from. Ngavirue 
explains that one challenge that remains is that one single opinion on genocide and reparations does not 
exist in the German coalition government, which may complicate the outcome. Ngavirue expresses that 
“there is therefore a need to get a consensus in Germany which will help our negotiations.”348 
 
4.2.2. Apology  
 
 An official state apology has yet to take place. Negotiating an official apology is within the mandate 
of Special Envoy Ngavirue.349 Katjavivi claims that “there is an acceptance…that once an agreement 
has been concluded, an official apology will have to be conveyed when the time comes.”350 Members 
from the traditional authorities who have argued for stronger representation in the negotiations have 
contended that before an apology is made, they have to be permitted to “vent our frustrations and our 
anger…the truth must be talked there…they need to look us in the eye and say, ‘we are sorry about that, 
it was wrong, let’s now close that chapter and move on’. It’s part of the healing process. We need to 
hear it from their mouths, and they need to hear it from our mouths.” 351 Therefore, how representatives 
are included in the negotiations to articulate grievances will play a critical role in whether an apology 
will be accepted by all members of the affected community. The ongoing negotiations are undoubtedly 
inimitable, and it cannot be stressed more that the ongoing negotiations ought not to be a missed 
opportunity for both governments to assure that members of the affected communities heal from their 
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past with a sincere apology followed with compensation. Whether the Namibian government and 
Herero and Nama chiefs in the ONCD-04 accept Germany’s formal apology, this may have little effect 
on chiefs and activist organisations in the Riruako group. Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, an apology without additional forms of efficient reparations can be perceived as meaningless.352  
 
4.2.3. Return of Remains  
 
The return of skulls and remains in August 2018 was notably different from previous repatriations since 
the change in Germany’s foreign policy on genocide. Ngavirue explains that Germany has come to 
accept full responsibility for the expropriation of skulls and remains, whereas in earlier accounts, they 
argued that it was a non-state issue where private researchers had extracted body remains.353 This was 
negotiated during state-to-state dialogue, whereas before the German state did not hold itself 
accountable for the extraction of skulls during the colonial era, arguing that the extraction was organised 
by private research units.354 The delegation of seventy-four people, comprised of traditional leaders and 
government officials, was led by the Minister of Education, Arts and Culture, Katrina Hanse-Himarwa 
and the event was held in a Lutheran church in Berlin with the attendance of invited German VIP guests.  
 
Whether this recent handover of skulls was less superficial than the previous attempts, highlighting a 
change in Germany’s recognition of responsibility to repair, has been debatable in Namibian media, 
and by Kössler and Melber. Minister Hanse-Himarwa stated that the Namibian government appreciated 
that the German government had agreed to a state-to-state handover for the first time and that these 
were necessary steps towards achieving reconciliation with Germany.355 This change in conduct is 
further noted as a delegation of German officials led by the Minister of State at Germany's Federal 
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Foreign Office, Michelle Müntefering, travelled to Windhoek to attend and observe respective rituals 
for the return of human remains in August 2018.356 However, Kössler and Melber argue that repatriation 
process “was marred by friction”.357 The authors consider this ceremony with a pinch of salt, arguing 
that negotiations between the two governments are in ‘impasse’ as the “full recognition of the genocide, 
an appropriate apology and a willingness for redress on the side of Germany” 358 remain unresolved. 
Therefore, similar to the issue of an apology, repatriation cannot be separated from other reparative 
obligations that Germany is reluctant to address. This is noted in speeches in the ceremony in which 
‘official pronouncements’ on formal recognition of genocide and redress remained elusive.359  
 
The ceremony was under the responsibility of the German Protestant Church and the Namibian Council 
of Churches, which the authors speculate as an “obvious attempt to keep a low profile on the side of the 
German state.”360 Rukoro expressed that the venue of the handover was not formal enough as it was not 
a government building, rather a Lutheran Church that was complicit in the genocide. 361 Furthermore, 
Rukoro expressed dissatisfaction in the Namibian media towards both German and Namibian 
governments as members of the OGF and NGTC were not initially invited to speak during the handover 
of remains. In addition Rukoro argued that the German activists supporting the OGF and NGTC, and 
who have been raising awareness in Germany about the genocide and call for reparations, were excluded 
from entering the venue.362 Therefore, satisfaction to the victims – one pillar of reparations – differs 
amongst the Riruako and Maherero group. However, even members of the community cooperating with 
the Namibian government stressed that any acts of contrition would be measured against other 
reparative obligations that continue to lack.  
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4.3. New York Lawsuit   
 
Ngavirue notes that the state-to-state negotiations and the New York lawsuit are being held as separate 
issues by both governments, therefore it is necessary to explore separately how the German government 
responds to the ongoing attempts to summon Germany (Defendant) to the New York District Court by 
Rukoro and the OGF/NGTC (Plaintiff). According to Kaumbi, the German state’s response have been 
very negative and have reinforced the sense of injustice felt by some members in the Herero 
communities. Since the lawsuit was first lodged in January 2017, the requests have been centred on 
material and symbolic reparations, and that Germany enter negotiations with the elected members of 
the affected communities, considering that the plaintiffs of this case have been excluded – as equal 
counterparts – in government negotiations. According to their Amended Class Action Complaint, filed 
14 February 2018, this is a violation of international law as Germany is a signatory to the 2007 UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. In this sense, they do not have the support of a state 
and therefore have resorted to lawsuit in order to have Germany engage with them.  
 
 Since its launch in 2017, Germany pledged state immunity and refused to be summoned to a foreign 
court.363 In response to the Amended Complaint, Germany submitted a Motion to Dismiss, stating that 
the New York District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the US courts’ Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act (FSIA).364 Therefore Germany is not legally obligated to be tried in a US court. Therefore, 
the asymmetrical positions of power of a state versus a group of individuals is apparent in this case 
despite any UN resolution or declaration should domestic laws protect them. However, the New York 
District Court urged them to appear in court to vouch its defence of state immunity, as state immunity 
provided by the FSIA is wavered for severe crimes such as genocide.365 In 2018, a year after the court 
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case was lodged, Kaumbi is disappointed that the merits of the case have not been addressed whilst the 
issue of state immunity continue to be contested in court. Furthermore, the level of acknowledgement 
that is conciliatory and remorseful that the Plaintiff under Rukoro seek from Germany is undermined. 
In the Defendant’s 2018 Motion to Dismiss, the German government acknowledge the Plaintiff’s 
‘alleged’ causes for a case, however do not confirm them:  
“German colonial authorities allegedly seized their land and livestock and the 
German authorities allegedly turned a blind eye to systematic rape and the use of 
the people in forced labor... The German Imperial troops allegedly killed over 
100,000 people and forced the survivors into concentration camps... The Amended 
Complaint alleges that there has been no reparation or compensation for these acts... 
The Plaintiffs allege that they have not been permitted to participate in recent talks 
entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Namibia.”366 
 
The purpose of such language is undoubtedly to reduce legal obligations to pay reparations in monetary 
compensation, as they acknowledge the accusations as ‘alleged’. The legality of this case is considered, 
however what must be deliberated is that the narrative of genocide and causes for remorse continue to 
be downplayed. Furthermore, it should be considered that the OGF and NGTC have taken legal action 
as a last resort due to the lack of political power to engage with the German government on reparations. 
Therefore, Germany’s response is not only a dismissal of legal obligations, but can be seen as a 
continuation of political expression to denounce the severity of the historical injustice, which has 
consequently resulted in legal action. Kaumbi highlights that the German government has refused to 
enter negotiations with the elected members of the affected communities, however they continue to 
hope for an out of court settlement.367 Therefore, whilst the Maherero group have aligned themselves 
to the Namibian government structures and therefore have their energies and requests channelled into 
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negotiations, which Germany arguably continues to undermine, the Riruako group have received less 
satisfaction out of their engagements, or lack thereof, with the German government.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Although reparations claims are embedded in legal and moral spheres, it is ultimately a political process. 
Reparations is a political process in which acknowledgement of victimisation and warranted redress are 
demanded, negotiated, ignored and/or reluctantly adhered to, based on social conditions, norms and 
pressures. These conditions shape victim group agency, mobilisation, and subsequently their access to 
resources. A victim group’s political opening is further shaped by discursive openings for trauma 
narrative articulation and whether this narrative resonates with a wider audience. 368 The Herero/Nama 
Genocide is the first genocide of the twentieth century, however the history of acknowledging this 
genocide, which is a crucial element of reparations claims, has been influenced by international politics 
and social norms of colonialism and post-colonialism. The international norm around recognising 
colonial genocides over the last century was in a ‘developing’ process as decolonisation only begun 
shortly after the 1948 UN Genocide Convention. As a result, many nations in the Global North did not 
support the official acknowledgement of the unique crime at first, as many colonial powers were guilty 
of ‘cultural’ genocide. 369 Furthermore, in an international post-colonial context there is a general 
tendency that governments in the Global North (Europe and North Americas besides African 
Americans) do not support reparations for historical injustice, whereas generally speaking, governments 
and actors in the Global South (Africa, Latin America and Asia) support such claims. 370 This is arguably 
due to colonial amnesia and denialism in which former colonisers collectively do not experience the 
legacies of colonial historical injustices such as loss of land and persisting inequalities. These burdens 
are however experienced by descendants of historical injustices.371 This gap of experiences and public 
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memory is where politics, specifically positions of power, shapes reparations processes. Kössler 
employs five dimensions of public memory as a post-colonial practice: assertion, commemoration, 
denial, amnesia, and recognition.372 These are reflected in positive (assertion, commemoration, 
recognition) and negative (denial and amnesia) attitudes that either keep the memory alive or ignore it, 
and therefore either assist in the healing or re-victimisation of descendants that cannot easily forget this 
past. The negative attitudes – denial and amnesia – have arguably dominated former colonisers’ public 
memory of some historical injustices that took place in the name of colonialism. This thesis is not 
arguing for reparations for colonialism, which is a different debated topic. It is rather arguing that crimes 
that breached international laws at the turn of the twentieth century and attempts for redress have been 
pushed into a ‘lawless’ corner in which rights of the former colonised are problematically contested. 
 
Based on this international power enjoyed by the Global North, synchronic to Western states, it took 
several decades after the 1948 UN Genocide Convention for the international community to 
acknowledge some colonial atrocities as genocides. Woolford and Wolejszo refer to the contradiction 
of the Jewish Holocaust’s effect on other genocides. The authors discuss the Jewish Holocaust as the 
prototypical genocide, of which all other genocides are measured against. Therefore, while Jewish 
reparations claims have influenced other victims to articulate their grievances and demand justice, it 
has also become a reference point in which other genocides are seen as ‘lesser genocides’ in comparison 
to the Jewish Holocaust.373 Members in the Herero community have articulated that there has been little 
difference between the Herero Genocide and the Holocaust, noting that the only difference was that one 
genocide persecuted Europeans. This double standard can be arguably attributed to attitudes of colonial 
denialism/amnesia. While the Herero/Nama Genocide was acknowledged as a genocide by Lemkin, the 
pioneer of the term, activist Reverend Scott in the late 1940s, and by Herero chiefs, the UN Whitaker’s 
Report in 1985 can be seen as a great symbolic international achievement that boosted notions of 
reparations claims. The German government on the other hand officially evaded such terms, ‘genocide’ 
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and ‘reparations’ for legal purposes, to the dissatisfaction of the affected communities, whose daily 
lives continue to be impacted by the genocide. After shifts in the international arena in which several 
genocides were being acknowledged, such as Germany’s acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide 
in 2015, Germany officially acknowledged the Herero Genocide in 2015 in order to avoid double 
standards.  
 
Considering that the acknowledgment of victims of genocide is a political process influenced by 
positions of power and influence, it is understandable that having reparations claims met is 
correspondingly a political process. While in theory, reparations has evolved to be victim centric, the 
politics of defining victims translate into the politics of reparations. Reparative Justice Theory suggests 
that reparations is greater than transferrals of resources and monetary compensation, and should include 
symbolic processes such as acknowledgement, apologies, memorialisation, return of remains, and 
acceptance of responsibility to make amends and repair. These symbolic processes are often not so 
easily and organically adhered. Political demands and strategic litigation that bring perpetrators to repair 
injustices do not exactly spell out remorse, and any successful outcomes would appear more as a loss 
for the German government rather than a moral gain. However, components of Reparative Justice 
Theory continue to be central to requests made by Namibian actors. Katjavivi argues that reconciliation 
through reparations can be a win-win outcome as Germany can place their painful past to rest as well.374 
This is further reflected in the OTA spokesperson Kaumbi’s statement that calls for conciliatory conduct 
from Germany, in which one can “repair an injustice through your conduct…[if] you have proper 
remorse and respect, people will start to look at it differently.”375 However, symbolic gestures seem to 
be avoided out of fear of possible legal accountability.  
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The politics of reparations is not limited to the perpetrator vs. victim paradigm, as politics within a 
victim group can also shape contestation around reparations processes. In a post-independent Namibia, 
the Herero collective political power is undermined in a democratic Namibia in which their numbers 
have been reduced to a minority as a direct result of the genocide. It has been speculated that the Herero 
could have been a major political force in Namibia, however the loss of 80 percent of the Herero 
population has placed them in a significantly inferior democratic position to the Owambo group.376 The 
leading party, SWAPO, have a responsibility to all Namibians, including those who have not been 
affected by genocide. In addition, there are Namibians who have opposed reparations claims, arguing 
that the Herero had violently taken their land before the arrival of German settlers.377 Therefore, the 
Namibian government needs to take a complex history into consideration, whilst acknowledging that 
this unique atrocity that affected the Herero and Nama disproportionately needs redress. Therefore, how 
this genocide fits into Namibia’s long history of colonialism and justices has led to several views on 
what reparations should mean not only to the Herero and Nama, but to Namibia. This invites further 
political contestations around reparations for genocide, and not reparations for colonialism. 
 
Therefore, as demonstrated in this case study, not all reparations movements speak with one unified 
voice, as noted by schism between Riruako and Maherero group.378 The two groups differ in terms of 
political allegiance, acknowledgments of paramount chieftaincy and situations of the genocide in a post-
independent political context. The Riruako group has played a pivotal role in the reparations movement, 
considering that it was this group that articulated the first requests for reparations for genocide from the 
German government and separated their claims from other colonial atrocities in Namibia. The Maherero 
group on the other hand have viewed the genocide as part of a bigger colonial context in which they 
need to situate their reparations claims within a political context in which all Namibians suffered under 
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colonialism, whilst acknowledging that special duties are owed to the affected communities. Therefore, 
although the history has shaped the identity of the affected communities, including the Namas, politics 
affects the different platforms in which grievances are articulated and heard by Germany, as seen with 
the Maherero group that are more politically affiliated with SWAPO. The SWAPO-led government, 
furthermore, has a role to play in the national memorialisation of the Herero/Nama Genocide and assist 
in the symbolic healing of the descendants. Tension has built between the OTA and the Namibian 
government, given that previous memorialisation and commemoration of the liberation of Namibia has 
been dominated by SWAPO narratives, which various scholars have argued has reduced the presence 
of the Herero and Nama rise against colonialism and the genocide that ensued in national public 
memory.  
 
Furthermore, the government previously took a passive position on reparations claims from Germany 
following independence in favour of development aid, whilst the early pioneers of the reparations 
movement under Riruako persevered purposely despite the lack of state support. Therefore, the politics 
of reparations is further deliberated in Riruako’s Motion on Genocide that was unanimously passed in 
the Namibian parliament in 2006, which signalled the government’s active role in facilitating 
negotiations between representatives of the affected communities and the German government. This 
has yet resulted in two avenues for reparations claims a decade later: a state-to-state negotiations 
officiated in 2015, in which the Maherero group have accepted government terms in which the 
government-elected Ngavirue will lead the negotiations; and a lawsuit against the German government 
by the Rukoro group for reparations, in which the Rukoro group argue for the right to represent 
themselves in state-to-state negotiations. Schism continued considering that there is a difference of 
opinion on the government’s leading role, where some such as the Rukoro group, have interpreted the 
Motion’s point to incorporate the Namibian government as an interest party and disagree with the 
government’s approach to champion the negotiations. The Maherero group on the other hand have 
accepted the government’s compromise and work alongside Ngavirue in supportive roles, sit in 
meetings with the German Special Envoy and make approved demands through Ngavirue. The aim of 
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this thesis is not to ‘pick’ one group over the other, however to highlight their political positions that 
shape their political openings to claim reparations.  
 
Rather, this thesis is focused on Germany’s different responses to these two groups, in which a common 
thread of superiority shapes their conduct with Namibian actors. This thread of superiority is 
synonymous to Kössler argument that Germany’s relationship with Namibia in a post-colonial context 
is asymmetrical.379 Although Germany’s foreign policy since 2015 has been notably different on paper, 
this thesis has deliberated whether this new foreign policy to reach a common understanding with 
Namibia has been fully translated into ideas of Reparative Justice Theory. Prior to 2015, Germany 
repeatedly insisted that there were no legal grounds for reparations and that too much time had passed 
for an apology. Furthermore, Germany’s annual development aid from a wealthy First World nation 
has been used as a tool to address the past ambiguously. This is further noted in poor attempts for 
apologies (2004) that indiscreetly reinforced Germany’s position to determine what dues are owed, and 
return of remains (2011 and 2014) in which the German government absolved itself of state 
responsibility to return the skulls of Herero, Nama, Damara and San genocide victims.  
 
However, there has been a global shift in which former colonised groups are having articulations of 
grievances heard and met and/or contested. While former colonisers are treading carefully, so as not to 
open Pandora’s Box, there have been examples that demonstrate that there is political shift in accepting 
responsibility to repair. In 2013, Britain agreed to pay reparations to its victims in detention camps 
during the Mau Mau rebellion. That same year, the Dutch government offered an apology and 
compensation to widows in Indonesia who had lost their husbands to the colonial war in which 
thousands of men were executed.380 The British government has recently paid compensation to ex-
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guerrilla fighters in Cyprus for human right abuses during their independence war in the 1950s.381 More 
recently (2018). The first three examples, compensation was governments were forced to pay via court, 
which is leading to pre-emptive approaches by former colonisers. For example, France announced its 
intentions around the restitution of stolen African artefacts during the colonial era to the continent in 
2018.382 Germany’s official acknowledgement of the Herero/Nama Genocide is situated within a global 
political shift in which strong redress the relatively week, whether through strategic litigation or 
negotiations. 
 
Germany’s official acknowledgement of the genocide can be interpreted as a departure from previous 
foreign policies which avoided terms such as ‘genocide’, ‘reparations’ and ‘apology’. While Germany 
have included ‘genocide’ in their foreign policy (2016), there are arguably small traces of denialism in 
their conduct with Namibian actors. Therefore, this thesis argues that there is a difference in officially 
acknowledging victims of genocide, which is as simple as incorporating the words into foreign policy, 
and morally acknowledging the victims of genocide, which is to translate these words into action and 
conduct. Furthermore, to consider and treat victims of genocide and their descendants as equal 
counterparts. The caution around accepting full responsibility to repair may be based on the reluctant 
shift in global political norm in which former colonisers are being held accountable for crimes under 
colonialism. Although paying reparations may be ‘an investment in Germany’s reputation,’ Melber 
(2017) suspects that Germany is “expected to act with loyalty to fellow Western states instead of pave 
the way for many more claims of a similar nature”.383 However, quite simply, it may not only be an 
issue of accepting responsibility, but a difference in opinion on how to accept responsibility, which is 
Germany’s tendency of setting the standards and approaches to ‘heal the wounds’ or ‘address the past’ 
via development aid. 
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Therefore, Namibia’s attempts to keep development separate from reparations continues to be an issue, 
even though the two governments accepted that the two would be distinct. Both Ngavirue and Kaapama 
admit that this progress was not easily accepted by the German government who continue to refer to 
their development aid during negotiations as a means to subdue the Namibian position. Therefore, 
Germany’s constant suggestions towards development aid in reparations negotiations resembles 
Germany’s attitude towards reparations claims a decade ago. Secondly, while the Namibian team 
pronounce their requests as ‘reparations’ during negotiations, the German team address proceedings as 
‘healing of wounds’, a term that state officials previously (pre-2015) used in order to avoid state 
responsibility to repair in full.  Therefore, there lacks a common understanding and common language, 
which German Special Envoy Polenz previously expressed was a priority. While the term ‘reparations’ 
is more humbling towards Germany’s duties to descendants of genocide, ‘development aid’ portrays 
Germany as a ‘rescuer’, a common paradigm concerning former colonisers and former colonised who 
are dependent on the former’s wealth.  
 
The symbolic nature of Reparative Justice continues to be a contested area in this case study. While the 
third repatriation of skulls in 2018 has been regarded as progress by some, others have highlighted a 
continuity of Germany’s tendency to deal with claims superficially. One positive change was the 
German government’s active participation in the repatriation’s organisation and handover, compared to 
previous repatriations (2011 and 2014) when German VIP state officials did not participate or attend. 
However, merits of this repatriation ought to be measured alongside Germany’s speeches at the 
ceremony that evaded terms such as ‘genocide’ and ‘reparations.’ Furthermore, while it has been 
confirmed that an apology is underway and will be delivered once negotiations are finalised, this 
apology is yet to be confirmed to be packaged as ‘reparations’ as the German Special Envoy Polenz 
and his negotiating team refrain from using this term in the media and during negotiations.  
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The German government’s sense of superiority as a Western nation in state-to-state negotiations has 
also offered them protected treatment in terms of legal litigation. The lawsuit in New York faced similar, 
if not worse, continuities of post-colonial positionality and traces of denialism as Germany claimed 
state immunity and refused to be summoned to a foreign court.384 This is a political obstacle as it is 
extremely difficult to sue a state in court, obligating a government to accept full responsibility, let alone 
a Western state. Therefore the shifting norm that is bringing former colonisers to atone for crimes under 
colonialism, has yet to have its full impact. Moreover, considering that the plaintiff is a none-state actor, 
the Rukoro group’s political opening is severely undermined whilst Germany enjoys its privilege of 
‘state immunity’ under US courts’ Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA).385 While the Rukoro group 
have built a strong case against the German government, merits of the case cannot be legally addressed 
in court until the issue of state immunity is settled. However, in order to achieve reconciliation, it can 
be argued that Germany should concede some of its power in order to face its past by levelling with 
members of the affected communities. Melber argues that “material reparations in relation to the size 
of German state coffers, compensation for damages could solve a problem and might even be an 
investment for Germany’s reputation.”386 Although the Rukoro group have pursued reparations through 
class action lawsuit, the overall aim is to have an out of court settlement in which they can be regarded 
and treated as equal counterparts to the German government in which their grievances are articulated 
and acknowledged, requests met, and in which they can close this dreadful chapter with dignity and 
satisfaction. Therefore, despite any possible future conclusions that may result from the state-to-state 
negotiations that could possibly – and arguably – lead to the satisfaction of the Maherero group, Kaumbi 
insists “that we [OTA] will still continue with our fight.”387  
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